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PREFACE 
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Conference 
on Comparative Fertility Transition in Asia, held in Tokyo in 
March 1978. Data for the study were collected as part of a 
cross-national project, described in the Foreword, which also 
identifies the other investigators and the funding sources. 
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EDITOR'S FOREWORD 
This paper is the first in a new subseries of Papers of the East-West 
Population Institute, entitled Current Studies on the Value of Chil­
dren. The subseries will consist mainly of comparative analyses of data 
from the Value of Children (VOC) project, a cross-national study of' 
parents' perceptions of' the satisfactions and costs of children. Also in­
cluded will be summaries of' findings from individual countries in the 
VOC project, as well as reports based on studies that are not part of' 
the project but have a similar focus. 
The VOC project began in 1972 and was carried out in two phases. 
The first phase consisted of interviews with relatively small samples of 
parents in six countries. Results Of the first phase of' the project have 
been reported elsewhere. 1 Il the second phase, which is the focus at' 
this subseries, interviews were conducted with larger samples of' huis­
bands and wives--in most cases nationally representative samples -in 
eight countries. These surveys were carried out in Indonesia, the Re­
public of Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand. Turkey, 
and the United States. 2 In addition, a special study of wives with one 
child in the West German state of' Bavaria was included in the second 
I 	 Comparative results for all six countries are reported in Fred Arnold and others, 
The Value of Children: A Cross-National Study, Vol. 1,Introduction and Com 
parative Anal*vsis (Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, 1975). Separate 
reports for each country are also available or projected in the same series 
(Vols. 2-7). 
2 	 Coinvestigators from these eight countries were involved in the project from 
the outset and participated in the design and pretesting of the core question­
naire; they also had responsibility for the conduct of the research in their own 
countries. The coinvestigators were: Masri Singarimbun and Russell K. Darroch 
(Indonesia); Sting Jin Lee (Republic of Korea); Rodolfo A. Bulatao (Philip­
pines); Preter S.J. Chen, Betty Jamie Chung, and Eddie Kuo (Singapore); Tom 
T.H. Sun and Tsong-Shien Wu (Taiwan); Chalio Buripakdi, Nibhon Debavalya, 
and Visid Prachuabmoh (Thailand); Cigdem Kagitcibasi (Turkey); Lois W. 
Hoffman, Fred Arnold, and James T. Fawcett (United States). Support for the 
studies in these countries and for the comparative analysis was providea by the 
East-West Population Institute, the International Development Research Centre, 
the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Smithsonian Institution, 
the Research Institute for the Study of Man, and the U.S. National Institute for 
Child Health and Human Development. 
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phase research. 3 The surveys in these nine countries were conductedduring the period from January 1975 to March 19-77.This foreword provides an overview of the content and method­ology of the second phase of the VOC project. The overview containssufficient background, we believe, for most readers of the papers inthe subseries. For researchers interested in greater detail, however, se­lected Technical Notes are available on request from the EWPI Publi­cations Office. These reports, prepared by Rodolfo A. Bulatao andConstancia Angeles, provide information about the questionnaire(Technical Note No. 5), the comparative codebook (No. 2), samplingprocedures (No. 4), and survey procedures (No. 6).In the sections that follow, general information is provided aboutthe purpose, content, sampling procedures, and research methodology
of the VOC project. 
Purpose and content 
The objective of the VOC project is to develop new knowledge aboutchildbearing motivations and the relationship of these motivations tofamily size preferences and fertility. An assumption of the study isthat perceptions of the satisfactions and costs of children have an im­portant influence on decisions about family size. Thus survey meas­urements in the study are designed to assess attitudes and values re­lated to the variety of satisfactions derived from children and the costsinvolved in rearing them. Also measured are perceptions of alternativesources of satisfaction, as well as diverse background factors and niedi­ating variables. With this rich set of data, analyses are directed towardunderstanding the determinants and consequences of fertility behavioramong different social and cultural groups at various stages of the life
cycle.

The project reflects a conceptual approach that is basically utili­tarian-i.e., it is concerned with the value of children to parents. Social,cultural, and biological values of children are not ignored, but the sur­vey method necessitates that these dimensions be measured throughthe filter of parental perceptions. Other research approaches, such ascommunity studies and assessments of actual economic costs and 
3 The West German study was added to the VOC project after the core question­naire had been designed. A modified version of the q 'estionnaire was devel­oped for West Germany by coinvestigators Esther R. Mechler, Andrejs Urdze,and Brian R. Flay. Support for the study was provided by the DeutschenForschungsgemeinschaft and the Rockefeller Foundation. 
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benefits, are useful and complementary in providing different perspec­
tives on the value of children. 
The VOC project is especially indebted intellectually to work in thefields of psychology and economics. 4 But as the project ia- evolved
and as the cross-cultural data have been examined, a research perspec­
tive has been developed that differs from the earlier psychological or
economic approaches, yet retains elements from both of them andfrom other work in sociology and demography. Tis evolution and the 
potential for convergence are discussed in a number of recent publica­
tions, 5 including the present paper.
Our interest in the value of children is not purely academic, al­
though it should be noted that there has been until recently remarkablylittle basic research on motivations for childbearing. A majol impetus
for the project was concern about rapid population growth and the 
need to develop new ideas for public policies that might influencegrowth rates. Such policies are essentially efforts to alter societal pat­
terns of fertility motivations. Empirical data about the nature of those
motivations, their variations across groups, and their relationships to
other desirc;(and value orientations should be of obviou~s benefit in theformulation of population policies and programs. Our procedures for
obtaining such data are described in the following sections. 
Questionnaire, sampling, methodology 
The questionnaire used for the large-scale surveys was similar in many

respects to the one designed for the first phase of the project, but it
 
was improved through experience and expanded to cover topics not
included in the earlier research. Parts of the questionnaire were de­
voted to standard social, economic, and demographic information 
about the respondent and the household. I will not discuss those herebut will review, in summary form, the portions more directly relevant 
to assessing the value of children. 
4 	 The most influential sources were Lois W. Hoffman and Martin L. Hoffman,
"The value of children to parents," in James T. Fawcett, ed., Psychological
Perspectiveson Population, pp. 19-76 (New York: Basic Books, 1973); andRichard A. Easterlin, "Towards a socioeconomic theory of fertility: a surveyof recent research on economic factors in American fertility," in S.j. Behrman
and others, eds., Fertilityand Family Planning:A World View, pp. 127-56 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969).
5 See, for example, Fred Arnold and others, op. cit., and James T. Fawcett, "The
value and cost of children: converging theory and research," in Lado T.Ruzicka, ed., The Economic and Social Supportsfor High Fertility, pp. 91 ­114 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1977).
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In format, the questions included structlired and unstructured itemsand combinations of the two. Quantitative scaling of responses wasused extensively, but qualitative data were also obtained from open­ended questions and were analyzed through content analysis. In gen­eral, we tried to use more than one type of measurement for dimen­sions of the value of children that we considered important. The con­tent of the questionnaire was decided upon in workshops involving allof the investigators. Pretesting of various versions of the questionnairein all countries resulted in extensive modifications. Rigorous proce­dures for translation and back-translation were used in most countries,to assure conceptual equivalence of the items.The tables in this first comparative paper illustrate results obtainedfrom various Questionnaire items, with emphasis on responses to open­ended questions on the advantages and disadvantages of having children.Other types of queslicns were used to measure the value of children ingeneral, the next child, certain numbers of children, male and femalechildren, and so on. In addition, questions were included to compare
the value of children with the value to the respondents of other ob­jects, activities, or goals. Following is a summary of tile questionnaire
items that dealt specifically with the value and cost of children: 
Open-endedquestions 
Advantages and disadvantages of having children, compared with not
having any children
 
Reasons for not wanting more or fewer than the respondent's desired
 
number of children
 
Reasons for wanting sons and daughters
 
Qualities desired in sons and daughters when they are grown
 
Feelings about having only one 
child
 
Children as a 
means to fulfill life values rated as important by re­
spondent
 
Aspects of raising children that entail the greatest expense
Aspects of raising children that cause worry and emotional strain 
Activities of respondent that are curtailed or precluded by having
children 
Ways in which a person's life is changed by having children 
Struicturedqtuestions 
Reasons for wanting or not wanting another child (22 items) 
Xiii 
Preferred sex composition among children 
Importance for tile child of having siblings 
Qualities desired in children (5 items) 
Contribution of sons versus daughters to life values rated as important 
by respondent
 
Contribution of small versus large number of children to life values
 
rated as important by respondent
 
Age at which children provide the most happiness for parents 
Satisfactions provided by having children ( 19 items)
 
Expectations copcerning economic or practical help from sons and
 
daughters (5 items)
 
Perceived economic burden of different numbers of ch !,7ren 
Age at which a cild is most costly
 
Whether a son or daughter is more costly
 
Degree of worry and emotional strain caused by children 
Whether a son or daughter causes more worry and emotional strain 
Extent to which children interfere with other activities 
Ranking of four types of costs of children 
The classificationl scheme for values and disvalues presented in 
Bulatao's paper represents one way of organizing the diverse dimen­
sions of the value of children within a coherent framework (see p. 7).
The numerous response categories are indicative of the wide range of 
variables assessed, covering areas that might be broadly characterized 
as psychological, social, and economic. The qualitative data from the 
project were coded in highly specific categories to allow rearrangement
of the responses to fit various conceptual or theoretical schemes. 
Sampling procedures 
Samples for the survey in phase two of the VOC project were designed
to be large enough to permit analysis oi"various subgroups and to be 
nationally representative where possible, to allow generalizations
about the country as a whole. Married women in the childbearing years
were the main target group, but a subsample of husbands was also in­
terviewed in each country except West Germany. The size of these sub­
samples ranged from about one-quarter to about one-half of the num­
ber of wives interviewed. 
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Decisions about the details of sample size and sampling procedures
were left to the investigators in each country, most of whom had the
assistance of sanmpling consultants. Stratified, multi-stage samples weredrawn in all countries, utilizing systematic random selection or simple
random selection procedures. ExcluO';ng West Germany, the number
of wives interviewed ranged from 977 to 2,6 14; the number of his­bands, from 382 to 1,311. In all, more than 20,000 respondents wereinterviewed in the second phase of the VOC project (14,-23 wives
and 5,68 1 husbands). The ipp,.r age limit for wives was 39 in most
 
countries, but 40 in Singapore and 44 in Taiwan.
 
National representativeness 
was the aim in all countries except Il­donesia and Wes, Germany, although certaini areas were excluded in
several countries, for such reasons as accessibility and security prob­lenis. The indonesian sample was designed to provide comparison o(

two major ethnic grouLps, the Javanese in Central Java and the Sun­danese in West Java. The West German sample was limited to a sample
of' 296 young wives with only one child in the state of Bavaria; in con­
trast to other countries, the VOC study in Germany was designed with
the primary aiun of providing insight into tile reasons for a decliningbirth rate and an increase in the prevalence of one-child families.
Further informati,,n about the type of sample in each country is
provided in Table 3 of' this paper; additional details about selection
 
procedures and other matters are availaole in VOC Technical Note
 
No. 4. 
Research procedures 
The principal investigator in each country had responsibility for or­ganizing the fieldwork and setting up procedures for coding and check­ing data. A common framework for research procedures was agreed
upon at three workshops of coinvestigators that were convened at var­ious stages of the project, but detailed arrangements lor implementa­
tion of the research varied from country to country.
The core questionnaire was augmented in most countries with items
of particular interest to the investigator or deemed useful in the cul­tural context. Translations of the English core (luestionnalire were nec­
essary in all countries but the United States and were usually ,arried
out with independent back-translations and other procedures for en­
suring conceptual equivalence. Translations were !notalways satisfac­
tory, however, which is not surprising in view of the complexity of
the task. In the Philippines translation into ten dialects was required,for example, and in Indonesia the questionnaire was translated first 
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into Bahasa Indonesia and then from that language into Javanese andSundanese. The research results are undoubtedly distorted to some ex­tent by translation difficulties, but we believe this is not a major prob­
lem for most items in the questionnaire.
Interviewers were in most cases college students or college graduates
and most were women. Male interviewers (in addition to females) were
employed in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. House­
wives with at least a high school education were employed in Taiwan,
and many of the interviewers in the United States were housewives em­ployed part-time by a survey research organization. In both Taiwan
and the United States most of the interviewers had prior experience in 
other research projects.

The length of training sessions for interviewers ranged from a few
days to two weeks. In all cases 
training included practice interviews,
and role-playing was often a part of the training. l)etailed interviewers'
manuals and questionnaire guides were prepared in each country,
based partly on the documents used in the first phase of the research,

and in some cases on materials compiled by the University of Michi­
gan's Survey Research Center for the second-phase U.S. study (which

was the first study to go into the field). The sharing of training man­
uals and other materials was another means, in addition to workshops,
for enhancing comparability among countries. 
All countries made arrangements for close supervision and editing
and checking of work (lone by interviewers. Often editing was done
while the team was still in the field, to facilitate corrections or re­
interviews. Such supervision led in a number of cases to interviewersbeing dismissed and their work being discarded. Throughout the proj­
ect, emphasis was given to quality of data collection procedures.
Similar emphasis was given to quality of coding procedures, espe­
cially for open-ended questions. In nearly all countries independent
double-coding was employed, in some cases for all questionnaires, in
others for a sample of (eLIetiOnnaires, and in still others for selecteditems on the questionnaire. The usual computer checks for consistency
and errors were run on the data after coding.
Initially data files were prepared for each country separately. Thesedata files, along with codebooks, were then forwarded to the project
coordinator, Rodolfo A. l3ulatao, fbr compilation into a single data 
file. The compilation required transformation for much of the data,
since coding procedures, although similar, were not identical across
countries. The ccmparative data file was separately checked for con­
sistency and errors. These data should be essentially accurate and valid, 
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in view of the care taken in data collection and coding. Nonetheless,
in a project as large as this one, with interviews conducted :n a variety
of cultaral settings, some errors and variations in meaning of responses 
are bound to have occurred. Where similar patterns and trends are 
shown across a number of countries and subgroups, however, we feel 
that the data can be interpreted with a high degree of confidence. 
Current Studies on the Value of Children 
Most of the papers in this subseries will draw upon the comparative
data from the VOC project, as noted earlier. These reports will be pre­
pared by the coinvestigators in the VOC project and their associates. 
In addition, we will welcome the submission of manuscripts from per­
sons not connected with the VOC project who have carried out similar 
studies. We are aware of numerous such studies in countries around 
the world, and we would be pleased to enrich this series by including 
papers that deal with the same topic but reflect different conceptual,
methodological, or cultural perspectives. 
James T. Fawc-t'­
ABSTRA CT A review of explanationsfbr the fertilit, transitionidentifies two factors not related to the demandfor children, contra­
ceptive availabilityanddelayed marriag2,andfive l'ctors relatedtodemand. This paper evaluates the five demandfactors--mortalityreduction, risingaspirations,vanishing economic rolesfor children, the
eme'gence of the conjugalJiiln'V, and weakening culturalpropsforhigh fertilitv-by comparing the values anddisvalues parentsattach to
children in seveni Asian countriesand two Western countriesat differ­
ent stages in the fertility transition.Both open-ended and structured 
measuresof 'alusand disvalues are utilized. Comparisonsare also
made acrossareas within two countries,and between parentslimiting
themselves to small ]amiliesand parentswith large amilies who have 
no intentionsofJamily limitation. The pattern of values essentially
supports the economic explanation, disconfirms the culturalexplana­
tion, and providespartialsupportjbr the other explanations. 
Although demographic transition theory has been characterized as ahistorical generalization in search of an explanatory principle, writings
on the transition have in fact offered a plethora of explanations for
fertility decline. In this pa per I attemPt to distinguish several major

explanatory lactors that others have touched on, focus on tiWose fac­tors that involve changes in the tesire for children, and determine if
cross-sectional survey data on ),arents' perceptions of the values anddisvales of children in seven Asian countries (and two Western coun­trs for comparison) are consistent with the operation of these ex­
lplanatory factors. The paper thus provides a way of organizing and in­terpreting the increasing data being collected on the value of children 
to 	parents.
In 1967 Concep,-,i6n and Murphy denigrated demographic transitiontheory: "The theory is not a theory but a description of a series ofhistorical events that have occurred with some regularity .... Demog­
ral)hers have proclaimed a theory when there is no theory. There is
only a crying need for a theory" (1967:6). What Concepci6n andMurpiy considered recent theoretical beginnings and labeled "tech­
nology theory" were little more than rationalizations for family plan­
ning programs: "All the world is anxious for lower fertility but does
not know how to go about it" (p. 9). In 197 1 Tabbarah also main­tained that demograpl1'.- transition theory, although describing when 
I 
and in what pattern birth rates fall in difIerent countries, gives "no 
explanation of why that decline took place" ( 1971:258). 
Although several of the authors who lirst identified demographic 
Stage s ill tile historical evolution of societies (Thompson, 1928; 
Blacker, 1947) may not have spent much time on the reasons for fer­
tility decline, explanations in fact antedate the 'ormulation of' transi­
tion theory (e.g., Landry, 1909, 1934; Stix and Notestein, 1940). Be­
fore Notestein introduced the term "demographic transition' ( 1945: 
41 ), the debate about physiological causes of the decline had been 
generally settled. Assessments of the causal impact of' modern contra­
ceptives had also reached co,.clusions that have remained largely tin­
changed since then: that "modern birth control is as much the resUlt 
of new interest in family limitation as its cause," according to Stix 
and Notestein ( 1940: 150) -a balanced view that is difficult to fault 
today. The most important factors in fertility decline, according to 
Notestein ( 1953: 18) were 
the growing importance of' the individual rather than the family, and particularly
the cxtended family gioup; the development ot'a rational and secular point of 
view, the growing awareness of the world and modern techniques through popular
education; improved health; and the appearance of alternatives to early marriage
and childbearing as amcans of livelihood and prestige for women. 
These factors had the greatest force, he added, in urban-industrial so­
ciety. Here is a whole series of' explanations containing, according to 
Caldwell (1977:30) "almost in mature form," the seeds of' all later 
theoretical developments. If'this ef'f'ort does not tI ualify as theory un­
der Concepci6n and Murphy's criteria of' "extracting the 11u1 !amental 
processes of' a phenomenon and identif'ying the crucial variables" 
(1967:6), the reason Must be the acknowledged abundance of' explana­
tions rather tlmn their scarcity. I 
To deal with this abundance, and with the elaborations, reorienta­
tions, restatements, and reconceptualizations provided by later writers, 
it is convenient to abstract a f'ew basic explanatory factors that under-
Jones (1977:9) describes sociological fertility theory as "a broad descriptive 
framework and a mas; of ad hoc, partial explanations which have some rele­
vance and validity but whose very eclecticism is seen by some as a standing re­
buke to the profession and by others as simply consistent with the complexity 
of the phenomena being studied." More than eclecticism, it would appear that 
some demographers have failed to see theory in these explanations because 
they form no simple paradigm for specifically demographic research (Kuhn, 
1970). By contrast, questions about the timing, rate, spread, and demographic 
components of fertility decline can give, and have given, rise to a whole series 
of demographic studies. 
3 
lie the superstructure of theory. This is not the same thing as the com­
mon practice of identifying tile crucial variables. That exercise oftenleads to lists that include women's education, men's education, wom­
en's wages, men's wages, ftainily income, and inlan t mortality (whichSch ultz [ 1976 1 has identified as the essential variables in microeco­
nomic fertility theory), or variables like literacy, life expectation at 
birth, primary school enrollment, male labor lorce in nonagriculturalpursuits, urbanization, hospital beds, newspaper circulation, telephones
installed, secondary school enrollment, and gross domestic product
(which Oeschli and Kirk I 1975] 
 use to identify transition thresholds).
Such variables cannot explain the historical fertility decline unless 
some intermediate links can be 	f'orged to individual fertility-related be­havior; and these links, often though not necessarily social-psycho­
logical, are what 1seek under the rubric of explanatory lactors.
 
EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR TIlE FERTILITY TRANSITION 
For current pturposes, I assume there are seven basic explanatory lac­
tors:
 
1. increased contraceptive availability and efficiency 
2. delayed marriage 
3. 	mortality reduction 
4. 	rising aspirations 
5. 	vanishing economic roles for children 
6. 	 the emergence of*the conjugal family
7. weakening cultural props for high fertility

Other classifications of the explanatory factors for the fertility transi­
tion may be possible, but this set can 
be made to cover all the major
explanations I am aware of, as will be detailed below. 2 These factors
might be seen as intervening between socioeconomic development,
modernization, or Westernization (however the process is character­ized) and fertility decline, though in appropriate circumstances, and,
conceivably, with greater frequency nowadays, these factors may oper­
ate independently of' large-scale societal transiormations. 
For Easterlin (1974), fertility determinants operate by affecting thedemand for surviving children (not merely for a particular number ofbirths), the potential SuL)ply of children (the number that biology and 
2 	 In his interpretation of demographic transition theory, Caldwell identifiedthree of these seven factors as the "mainstream arguments" for high fertilityin traditional settings-"high mortality, the lack of opportunities for individual
advancement, and the economic value of children" (1977:33). lis own theo­
rizing; focused largely on the third factor. 
4 
culture produce when no deliberate regulation is evident), or the costs
of fertility regulation or family limitation. 3 The seven explanatory
factors can fit under these three headings. The first factor, contracep­
tive availability and efficiency, which is understood here to include 
not only physical but also psychological availability and use-effective­
ness and may also be somewhat stretched to include abortion, obvi­
ously affects the costs of family limitation. The second factor, delayed
marriage, shall be assumed to be a supply factor. As Coale ( 1975) ar­gued, the postponement and avoidance of marriage in the European
transition wasprobably not related to any desire to reduce fertility,but to such considerations as the need for economic independence
and the desire for separate living quarters. Its effect on fertility, there­fore, through postponing childbearing and shortening the socially ac­
cepted childbearing period, is probably unrelated, other factors aside,to any desire for fewer children. The third factor, mortality decline,has both supply and demand implications, as will be discussed below.The remaining four factors clearly affect the demand for children.For completeness, two factors involved in the fertility transition
might be added tmt, far from explaining the transition, operate simul­taneotisly with the previous seven factors but in the reverse direction
 
to raise fertility. These are (8) improved fecundity (or fccundability
due to reduced breastfeeding), which is a supply factor, and (9) higherincomes, which Easterlin treats as affecting demand but whichSpengler ( 1966) treats as distinct. If the effects of income on the
other factors- particularly aspirations--are cc,,trolled, the direct effect
should be to allow couples to afford more children, assuming that chil­dren are not an inferior good (Becker, 1960). Table I summarizes all
nine factors, some of which will be discussed further below.

The relative importance 
ot demand. supply, and faio ily-limitation
costs in the fertility transition is difficult to assess. A reasonable, it'
oversimplified, assumption would seem to be that chang ,s in supply
and family-limitation costs are dominant in the early stages of thetransition, and changes in demand become important after the earlydeclines (Knodel, 1977; Coale, 1975). At any rate the demand factors ;account for a significant portion of the decline and are essential to it.As Coale (1973:65) has put it, a prerequisite for a major fall in maritalfertility is that "perceived social and economic circumstances must
make reduced fertilit 
-seem an advantage to individual couples." 
3 Easterla uses the term "fertility regulation." The term "family limitation" ispreferable, however, because not all types of fertility regulation are relevant.Parity-independent fertility regulation is properly considered a supply factor
affecting natural fertility. 
5 
TABLE 1 Explanatory factors for the fertility transition 
Factor
 (characterization) Locus of effect
 
Increased contraceptive availability and efficiency 
 Family-limitation costs 
Delayed marriage Supply of children
 
Mortality reduction (Demographic) 
 Supply of children andInsurance effect demand for children 
Price effect
 
Emotional investment
 
Rising aspirations for self and children (Psychological) Demand for children 
Vanishing economic roles for children (Economic) Demand for children 
Emergence of the conjugal family (Social) Demand for children 
Locus of costs and demands 
Companionate marriage 
Child-cen teredness 
Weakening cultural props for high fertility (Cultural) Demand for children
 
Lineage and kin group

Religious and social norms
 
Social status 
Improved fecundity Supply of children
 
Higher incomes 
 Demand for children 
LINKAGES WITH THE VALUES AND DISVALUES OF
 
CH ILDR EN
 
The demand factors should directly affect the values and disvalues of
children that parents perceive, producing changes that may be con­
sidered the value-of-children transition. The values and disvalues at­tached to children are typically diverse, including economic concerns, 
psychological satisfactions, and social rewards. They are also consider­ably variable, being occasionally different for sons and da ughters, forfirst-born, second-born, and later children, for yotLnger and older chil­dren, and so on. Finally, they tend to be dccply felt and strongly ileld.For current purposcs, a classification ot"values and disvalues shall be
used that is based on theoretical distinctions (e.g., L.W. Hoffman andM.L.. Hoffman, 1973) as well as on cross-cultural findings derived from 
a variety of survey qlIstions (Arnold and others, 1975: Bulatao, 1975).The three major clusters of values of children, in this classification, are:instrumental assistance from children, covering the uses--economic, 
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practical, kin-group strengthening, status-providing-to which children 
can be put; rewarding interactions with children, covering the socio­
emotional rewards, companionship, friendship, and fun that children 
generate; and psychological appreciation of children, covering the 
psychological impact of children oin parents. The four major clusters
of disvalues are: direct financial costs of children; childrearing de­
mands other than the financial. covering the added work, the strain,
and responsibility; restrictions on parents, social and personal as well 
as occupational; and costs to social relationships, covering marital 
strains and overpopulaion. The individual values and disvalues in 
each cluster, listed in tile Exhibit, represent all of those that have been 
comnmonly identified in studies Of the value of children. 
It is assumed that the supply and the family-'imitation cost factors 
do not directly affect these values and disvalues, though they may
have indirect effects in two ways: through affecting the demand fac­
tors and through affecting actual fertility, which could have feedback 
effects on values and disvalues. The demand factors, on the other 
hand, should directly affect values and disvalues attached to children 
and may in fact operate by modifying those values and disvalues. 
Each of the demand factors is complex. None, for instance, is ex­
clusively economic, or exclusively demographic, or exclusively psycho­
logical. However, .is convenient shorthand, I will refer to mortality re­
duction as tIle demographic explanation, to rising aspirations as the 
psychological explanation, to vanishing economic roles for children as
the economic explanation, to the emergence of tile conjugal family as 
the social explanation, and to weakening cultural props for fertility as 
the cultural explanation. The predicted effects of each of' these factors 
on values and disvalucs are shown in Table 2 and will now be discussed. 
For later reference, each prediction has been assigned a letter to indi­
cate the explanatory factor and a number to indicate the value or dis­
value cluster affected. 
Mortality reduction 
The "demographic" explanation, mortality reduction, operates as a 
supply factor in a positive direction, increasing family sizes because 
more children survive, more women live to the end of their childbear­
ing periods, and more men can reproduce over longer periods (Ridley
and others, 1967). These effects are usually associated with improve­
ment in fecundity, which is treated here as a separate factor. How 
mortality reduction affects demand is a complicated matter requiring 
careful distinctions. 
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EXHIBIT 	 Advantages and disadvantages of having children,
derived from content analysis of responses to open-ended
questions 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Instrumental 	assistance Financial costsHelp in housework Cost of educationHelp in old age Other financial costs
Financial, practical help Childrearing demands
 
Family name, line Mrea r k
Religious, social obligations Emotional strain
More workAdult status, social norms Health, pregnancy
 
Rewarding interactions Discipline
Companionship, love 
 Child's sickness 
Happiness Worry over child's future
Play, fun, distraction Other childrearing problems
Marital bond Restrictions on parents
 
Psychological appreciation Tied down
Living through children Can't work
Achievement, power 
 Costs to social relationshipsCharacter, responsibility Marital strains
Incentive to succeed 
 Overpopulation
Fulfillment 
Other 	 Other 
At the societal level, it has sometimes been argued that mortality re­duction will give rise, because of environmental and social factors, to 
an equilibrating fertility reduction (Davis, 1963). Societies are pre­
sumied to possess feedback mechanisms to maintain a stable equilibrium
of births and deaths, around which temporary fluctuations may occur(Retherford, 1976:34). Whether this isso is an extremely complex
issue that may be less a matter of empirical proof than general theo­
retical orientation. It seems more reasonable to adopt an opposing, so­
cial-Darwinian orientation that some societies at some points in theirhistory have had such equilibrating mechanisms but others have not,
and only those societies that have made adequate adjustments have
survived as integral entities (see, for example, Coale, 1975). Then thefertility reduction will be seen to result not from mortality reduction 
directly but from the presence and operation of the equilibrating
mechanisms, which in the present framework would be or would af­fect one or more of the other explanatory factors. There is a second 
reason for not accepting a direct mortality-fertility linkage as an effect 
of mortality reduction on demand for children: although fertility 
0 
TABLE 2 Predicted effects of demand-related explanatory factors on values and disvalues attached to
children 
Explanatory factor 
Value or 
disvalue cluster 
Mortality
reduction 
(Demographic) 
Rising
aspirations 
(Psychological) 
Vanishing economic Emergence of theroles for children conjugal family(Economic) (Social) 
Value cluster 
1 Instrumental 
assistance 
DI Insurance 
against mortality 
should become 
less prominent 
El Economic 
benefits should 
decrease 
2 Rewarding 
interactions S2 Marital bond, 
companionship 
should become 
3 Psychological P3 Should become more prominent 
appreciation more prominent 
Disvalue cluster 
4 Financial costs 
5 Childrearing 
demands 
6 Restrictions on 
parents 
7 Costs to social 
P4 Should rise 
P5 Should become 
heavier 
P6 Should become 
more prominent 
S4 Should rise 
S5 Should become 
heavier 
relationships 57 Marital strain 
should become 
more prominent 
NOTE: Each predicted effect is identified by a capital letter and a number. The letter represents the explanatory factor (asparentheses in the table heading); the number represents the value or disvalue cluster affected. 
Weakening
cultural props 
(Cultural) 
CI Status, so­
cial benefits 
should become 
less prominent 
C7 Concern 
about over­
population 
should become 
more promi­
nent 
characterized in 
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wUd be reduced in restoring equilibritum, the demand for children 
Who survive to particular ages would be unchanged. 
At the individual or family lcvel, mortality reduction has been hy­
pothesized to affec fert ility through increasing the nu1timber of de­
pendents (predominantly the young, thoutgh to some extent also the 
aged), throughi P1Set tilg inheritance systems and generally overburden­
ilg social structures designed for lower survivorship,. and through the 
reduced frcq uencV with which couples have to "replace" lost children 
(e.g., R. Freedman, 1903:226 27). These elects. again. should not be 
considered changes in demand, becaise individua lor cOtil e targets for 
surviving children need not be affected. They are changes in demand 
for births, but not for children: the fertilitV reduction implied by
these effects (with the minor exccption of higher numbers of aged de­
plende nts) is such as to restore previotis nlumbers of survivors. 
Distinct from the replacement effect, and in fact affecting demand 
for children, is tile insurance effect: instead of making up for child 
mortality, parents may have "extra" chiltren alicad of time in antici­
pat ion of fut tire mortality (Perlman, 1970; Wyvon and Gordon, 197 1;
Abhayaratne and Jayewerdene, 1968). It is unlikely that parents would 
play the percentages exactly, having jList enotigh children to coinmpen­
sate for probable losses, since mortality in the pretransitional period is 
not only high but also variable. It is much more likely that they would 
have more than necessary, and that more parents would have extra 
children than wo uld lose them through mortality (O'Hara, 1972), so 
that desired family sizes would be smaller where there was no need to 
compensate in advance. 
A second way in which mortality decline may affect demand is 
through changing the cost of children. Since it requires fewer births to 
provide some desired number of surviving children Under lower mor­
tality, the cost per sar .'ivor shotld decline (S. ('ochrane and J. 
Cochrane, 1971 ). lowever, if one co nsiders not only the costs of 
childbirth but also the costs of childrearing, it becomes evident that 
the cost per birth is higheriUnder lower mortality. Whether costs will 
be perceived to increase or decrease. therefore, depends on whether 
couples decide on a particulIa r faminily size or whether they make se­
quential decisions abotit each birth. Although the latter may be more 
likely (Namboodiri, 1972 Hass, 1974; Bulatao and Arnold, 1977 1,the 
ambiguity prevents any clear prediction about whether parents will 
perceive costs to rise. 
There is a third way, suggested by EI-Hamamsy (Heer, 1975:76), in 
which mortality reduction may affect the demand for children: under 
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low mortality conditions, parents may invest more of"their emotionalenergy in each child, and therefore have fewer emotional resources toraise added children. As with financial costs, however, a contradictory
argunIIent may be made: under high mortality conditions, parents mayfeel greater emotional tension in regard to each birth because of thechances of sickness and death. It is not clear, therefore, whether thedemand effects of mortality reduction are positive or negative. Apartfrom the prediction that posttransitional parents should perceive less
need for the security of having many children, the effects on values
and disvalues attached to children cannot be predicted. 
Rising aspirations 
The "psychological" explanation, rising aspirations, was identified asan important factor as early as 1890, when Dumont pointed to thedesire of the French middle classes to advance in social rank-to ob­tain more wealth and power, more beauty, more perf'ection, moreknowledge--as the motive for their smaller families. Political democ­
racy was supposed to have made such strivings realistic rather thanpurely wishlful. Although Dumont's depiction of capillarit, sociale hasf'ocused attention on strivings for social mobility, the aspirations noted 
are not restricted to the socially ambitio us, bUt more generally involve 
concern with standard of living, or the entire "range of' satisfactions
considered appropriate for a civilized existence" (Banks, 1954:10). Tothe attainment of these satisfactions, children, or at least many chil­dren, matter little. One's aspirations often embrace one's family, but
the means of their satisfaction is extrafamilial, Unlike many of the
 
positive sanctions available in traditional communities.
It is often suggested that the source of' these aspirations is urban or
Urban-industrial living (e.g., Notestein, 1945:40), though in the mod­
ern era global communication networks may be equally responsible.
More proximate and more specific sources of the individual's aspira­tions may be the members of the husband's occupational group
(Heberle, 1941; D. Freedman, 1963); one's adolescent experience, asaffected by the income level of one's parents (Easterlin, 1961, 1966);
and One's own current income level (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Most
aspirations arc asSuimed to be internalized by the individual couple.They may, however, also be the aspirations of' the state or the govern­
ment, which it imposes on the couple through legislation, as in the 
case of compulsory education. 
Between husbands and wives there is sonic asymmetry in rising as­pirations. Husbands' aspirations may rise first because of their links 
I ! 
with occupational and other networks outside the home, but wives*
aspirations will eventually rise farther becZLuse they hdive a greater dis­
tance to go. Wive:;' aspirations also have greater i pact on fertility be­
cause they are more likely to be inconsistent with raising large Irlrilies.The desegregation of sex roles is essential to raising wonien's aspira­
tions. Without this, wolnen "Cannot conceive of a1glamor role or a ca­
reer rOle which would compete with the childbearing role. They cannot
complain that children prevent their getinrg outsidC [lie house, beca use
outside activities are excluded :iny way'' (Davis, 1955:37). Crea ting

economic and edulcltonJl 1
o0potuitlities for women is one aspect ofimproving women's statIus: developing gre!tr equality withi I lIe f'1am­
ily is another, which mar equaI led to Ihigher aspirltions.An important distinction should be kade between aspirations for
onesell' or one's spouse an1d aIspiratiolis for on's children. It is possible
thait these develojp in sctL uence, dspira tioiis for onc's children and for 
o e's immediate family generally rising earlier aMrid being followed, in Ilater period when iildividuaisi haIs ftrrt her ti rid Cnn ined the' family­
centric perspective, by rising aspirations for ornesel f. A parallel distinc­
tion, in the microeconomic literatuore, is that between child quality andthe time cost of chilren. The desire for higher child q ali ty req aires
 greIter expe nditLires onl children. The time cost fa-ctor operates differ­
ently: with rising aspirations for oneself, the time spent onl childrern
 
does not increase bUt begini:; to appear more 
vaira ble since it could 
more profitably be spent to attain new goals or to salisfv new needs. 4 
If children increasingly interfere with parents' new aspirations, we

would expect the disvalues grO¢uped under "restrictions cii parents" to
become more promirent. As a1rgued earlier, this increase in prominence
 
may be greater for wives than for husbands. Higher aspir.tions for chil­dren, on the other hand, carnot be achieved witliour additional ex­pense. Children for whom parents have greater arubitiorrs should cost 
more and require more of' their parents' tire, attenition, and concern.
These disvalures fl'll into two clusters, relating to financial costs and to
childrearing demards. Aspira tions mray also have a positive side, insofar 
as children are concerned. AlthoLigh most of' the new asf)irations are 
not satisfied through children, SOme of them may focus on children, 
particuiarly when alterCatives are t.na1vailable or proscribed. Achieve­
4 Microeconomists also speak of changing tastes in children, which might involve
either child quality or preferences for commodities other than children. The
concept of tastes is extremely vague and unspecific (one might add distasteful),
almost like psychologists' use of the term "environment," and constitutes little 
more than those conditions one would lump under ceteris paribus. 
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ment motives, for instance, or the desire for personal fulfillhnent, maybe relatively new aspirations that might he partly satisfied in bearing or
rearing children. These va!ues are classified in the psychological appre­
ciation cluster, and one may therefore predict some, perhaps less dra­
matic, increase in the prominence of this cluster or of particular values 
in it. 
Vanishing economic roles for children 
The "economic" explanation, vanishing economic roles for children,
has had several proponents. Coontz (1957) contended that variations 
in the demand for child labor explain the fertility transition. Among
the wealthy, he said, child laoor was of little consequence; slaves were
available, and the wealthy could generally exert control over the pro­
ductive activity of others. Among the poor, on the other hand, thedecline in importance of child labor with the destruction of domestic 
industry in the West was temporarily compensated for by the labor 
demands of large-scale industrial production, until slower growth in
these countries and the increased time and expense required to prepare 
an individual for productive labor made children a poorer investment. 
Legal restrictions on child labor might be added as another cause of
the decline in the value of child labor, as might the development of 
pension and social security schemes that replace dependence on chil­
d re n. 
In contemporary peasant societies, it has bcen contended-though
Muellef (1976) disputes it-that children are of net economic benefit 
to their parents (Nag, Peet, and White, 1977; White, 1976). Expanding 
on this view, Caldwell (1977) has argued that there are only two types
of fertility regime: pretransition, where children are of net benefit to 
their parents, and posttransition, where children are a net cost. The
"great divide" between these two regimes is marked by the reversal in
the direction of "intergenerationvl wealth flows." Before the transi­
tion, the net flow -counting not only money but also goods and ser­
vices, as well as tile benefits due to the extra political power exerted 
by a man with many children-is toward the parents; after the transi­
tion it is toward the children. The cause Caldwell identified for this 
reversal was a change in family structure. 
Whatever causes the changes in the economic roles of children, the 
implication of these changes for perceived values is simply drawn: pre­
transitional parents should perceive there to be more economic bene­
fits from children than posttransitional parents. These benefits are notlimited to direct financial assistance, but may include assistance in old 
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age and practical help on tile farm or around the house that is not di­rectly remunerated. The instrumental assistance cluster includes all of
these values, though it includes others also. 
Emergence of the conjugal family 
The "social" explanation, the emergence of the c';njugal family, re­quires careful delimitation. Some sociologists have seen 
change in fam­ily structure as the central factor, the root and cause of all other social
changes tied to fertility. With modernization, the argument goes, thefamily loses its centrality in the culture, and its functions are increas­ingly taken over by distinct institutions. As a result, "the family orkinship group no longer dominates the social and economic reward
system and can no longer exert pressure toward large family size goals"(Goldsclieider, 197 1:148). This argument covers more ground than Iintend, since other factors, like aspirations or the economic role of

children, could easily be subsumed under it.
To the extent that the factors being considered can be viewed as
analytically distinct, the focus here is specifically on 
the shift from thefamily extended through mutual obligations to the nuclear, conjugalfamily, in which parents and children form a relatively self-contained,independent unit. Caldwell (1977) referred to this as the emotional
nucleation of the family, which he saw as a pe,:.!2",rly Western arrange­
ment undergoing rapid diffusion in non-Western areas. The shift inemotional focus should be more important than any shift in residentialpatterns, which is subject to such external influences as the housing

market. In considering the development of the Western family, Shorter
(1975) similarly emphasized the importance of sentiment in the his­torical emergence of the nuclear family. This first sexual revolution(which involved, besides the stress on romantic love, the sentiments of
maternal love and domesticity) resulted in 
a special sense of solidarity that separates the domestic unit from the surroundingcomrnunity. Its members feel that they have much more in common with one an­other than they do with anyone else on the outside-that they enjoy a privileged
emotional climate they must protect from outside intrusion, through privacy andisolation (Shorter, 1975:205). 
Caldwell saw emotionai nucleation as leading to fertility declinethrough reversing the intergenerational wealth flow. Since this hy­pothesis has already been covered under the previous factor, one might
ask here whether there are other ways that the nuclear, conjugal family 
may promote lower fertility.
Two types of answers have been suggested. First, the costs of rearing 
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children in a composite family or joint household do not impinge di­
rectly on the parents, but are distributed among all the members of 
thC household. This is true both for economic costs and for the effort 
and inconveniences of child care. Thus, in the extended family, "there 
is nc necessary implication that the husband must be 'able to Sulpport 
a wife and family' " (Davis, 1955:35). In the conjugal faim ily, by con­
trast, the economics of scalc in child production enjoyed by larger 
household units disappear, and costs can no longer be externalized 
and are shifted directly onto the parents (R. Freedman, 1963). 
Second, the conjugal family involves an intensification of emotional 
attachments within the family. In the modern, impersonal setting, the 
conjugal family provides one of the few settings in which personal af­
fective relations are maintained over long periods. In contrast, "popu­
lar marriage in former centuries was usually affectionless" (Shorter, 
1975:55). Both husband-wife and parent-child relationships were in­
tensified, as "the companionate aspect of marriage became emphasized 
over the reproductive aspect and the parent-child relationship shifted 
from one of exploitation in quantity to that of cultivation in quality" 
(United Nations, 1973:88). Aries considered this a major transforma­
tion, beginning around the seventeenth century, when the family "fell 
back upon the child, and its life became identified with the increas­
ingly sentimental relationship between parents and children" (1962: 
370). This aspect appears to parallel the rising aspirations factor, and 
in fact has one similar effect: r~arents make greater investments of' 
money, time, and concern in tleir children. In the case of' aspirations, 
however, the reason for this greater investment is the desire for a 
higher standard of' living for one's children. In the present case, the 
reason is the emphasis on greater closeness to them and stronger emo­
tional ties to them. The aspirations factor draws people out to com­
pete, or to encourage their children to compete, in the wider world. 
The conjugal family factor draws them inward for emotional satisfac­
tions. 
As a result of the conjugal family's emergence and spread, parents 
should perceive the costs of children and the demands of' childrearing 
(two separate disvalue clusters) to be heavier. As Shorter has succinctly 
put it: "Good mothering is an invention of' modernization" (1975:55).
The "reward" for this effort should be a greater sense of companion­
ship with children and of' the love they bring, or, in relation to our 
value classification, a greater prominence of the rewarding interactions 
cluster. Since the marital relationship also becomes more important, 
the effect of children on the marriage should become more salient. 
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Both negative effects, such as children generating more strain betweenh11usband and wife (which is in the last cluster, costs to soL:al relation­
ships), and positive eltects, such Ias their cementing the marital bond (inthe rewarding interactions ciLister), should be more readily per­
ceivcd. 
Weakening cultural props 
Tile last Cxplalnation is "'cultural." Weakening cultural props for highfertility refer to the sanctions that tile society, the com munity, and
other large social groupings employ to encourage or discourage fer­
tility. These sanctions may take the form of status or special honors
awarded for large families, religious and ethical norms and standards,
the imposition of traditional authority on the one hand and officially
enunciated government policy on the other, as well as various social 
arra ngeinents, such as inher;tance laws, that encourage or discourag9elarge families. The im portanmce of the attitudes generated by religious
and traditional sanctions is reflected in findings 01 apparent linguistic

and religious barriers in the geographical spread of the fertility decline
 
in Eur'ope ( Leasure, 19T2 Knodel. 1974).

Sanctions attached 
to fertility have been considered props in the 
sense that, in traditional societies, they encourage the high fertility 
necessary to comnpensate for high mortality. They supplement or pos­
sibly override individual interests in children and replace these with so­
cial interests. Traditional societies are assumed to bene fitfrom highfertility. Smaller social groups may eq ually benefit. The village is pro­
vided with more labor for food prod uction and assured olf continuity,
the religious group is ensured 01' potential followers to indoctrinate,
the corporate kin gro up is strengthened economically and militarily,
and its liiis projected into the future 5' (Lorimer, 1969). By contrast,
social groups in modern societies may benefit less from high fertility.For instance, large numbers of'children may make it difficult for I-am­
ilies to acquire or accLmulate land under conditions of growing pres­
sure on resources ( I)emeny, 1968). 
5 One could discuss these benefits to the corporate kin group as an aspect of the 
emergence of the conjugal family, but I have chosen to discuss them here, inpart because it is convenient to summarize external social pressures on couples'fertility decisions under the factor of weakening cultural props. There is also 
some substantive justification. It is not clear that parents in the extended fam­ily should have any greater desire to strengthen and perpetuate the group thanparents in the conjugal family. They are, however, under more immediate andconstant pressure from others in the household, so that the difference isa mat­ter of the force of social sanctions and is more properly classified here. 
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Couples may be aware ol' such benefits or harm to their member­
ship groups from children and act directly on that awareness. Or eachgrotp may attempt to provide rewards to influence couples' decisions. 
One important type of reward is social status, citlz !r in the form of
recognition as a full member of the community (after one has borne
children) or in the form of a higher position in the social hierarchy

(after many children).

Governinont sanctions, whether in support of' pronatalist or anti­
natalist policies, are a special type. Many governmnent programs affect
the other explanatory f'actors discussed above. The policies themselves,
hovever, may have '_,mecoercive force, particularly when community
networks are mobilized to support them. The "cultural" explanation 
may still be valid, however, even if government policies have little cf­fect, because the core of' this explanation has to do with the force of
traditional norms and their gradual deterioration, rather than with the
strength of the official modernizing policies that have difficulty dis­
placing them. 6 
If the weakening of cultural props for fertility does explain the tran­
sition, we would expect pretransitional parents to perceive greater lin­
eage or kin, religious, and social benefits in having children. We would
also expect them to emphasize more strongly the status rewards from
childbearing. All of these values fall in the instrumental assistance
 
cluster. The significance of' cultural 
norms would be further supportedif' posttransitional parents saw social costs and rewards of children that 
are in consonance with some wid,,ly accepted government policy. This
would generally mean that couples should perceive overpopulation as 
a problem that children aggravate. Since popular acceptance of suchpolicies cannot be assumed, however, the failure of this prediction
need not invalidate the cultural explanation. 
Summary of predictions 
Table 2 may be referred to again for a summary of the predi,:ted ef­
6 	Should there be an additional cultural explanation having to do with traditionalfatalism or irrationality in childbearing and the inability or inconceivability ofplanning one's family? Not necessarily, since this is already part of the contra­
ceptive availability and efficiency factor, which covers not only contraceptive
technoiogy but also the basic idea that one can limit one's family. Traditionalfatalism does not make consideration of demand factors irrelevant-various sur­veys show that even in relatively traditional settings most respondents can
enunciate both advantages and disadvantages of children (Arnold and others,1975)-though it may lead to more children than desired (which in turn may
change desires because of the feedback effects of behavior on attitudes). 
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ftects on valtes and disvalues of. each factor in the fertility transition.
It is conceivable that others would see different linkages,' but the onesI have identified appear to be the most obvious and direct connections. 
They also cover all of the demand-related factors. as well as all of the
value ald disvalue categories. It has been possible to link each demand­
related factor to sonC set of vaILes or disvalUes o childrenl. For each
of' the categories of'values and di:,valIes, oil tile other haind, a factor
affecting it has been identified. It appears that the extant explanations
for the fertility transition are comprehensive: at one time )ranother 
some aUtilor has focused on one or another valte or disaItie cateeorv 
as the possible explanation for the !'rtility transition. The a abiguotUs
effects of niortalitV reduction on co-,ts and childrearing demands are 
not inlmuded am01g the predictions. Two of the effects in Table 2 (the
effect of rising aspirations on ps appreci!tion valtics and thec1iological . 
effect of the emergelcte of the conitigal family on rewarding interac­
tioiis valies) actUally increase tile value of children, but it is assumedthat these effects are overwhelmed b%other el'fects of the same factorsin tile reverse direction, leading to lower fertility. Except for the ef­
fects of these two f'actors on the financial costs of children and on
childrearing demands, each predicted effect has a uniqiue source in oiie
of the five factors. It should be possible, therefore, to distinguish which
explanatory factors are more and which are less consistent with data on
the value of children. In tile tnlikely event that none of them is con­
sistent with the data, the other factors in Table I not involving demalnd 
for children woUld have to be taken as better explanations for the fer­
tility transition. 
In the remainder of this paper, I examine data oii values and dis­
values attached to children to determine which predictions are borne 
otit, and which factors, therefore, are likely to have operated in thefertility transition. Because good survey data oii the value of'childrenin past times is not available, cross-sectional comparisons will be madebetween cotiiitries presumably at different stages inl the fertility transi­
tion. Soiiie sub'lational comparisons will also be made aniong regions
within countries and among individUals whose differential fertility indi­
cates that they may be at ditferent stages in the transition. 
The predictions to be tested do not iinvolve any assumptioiis about
the catisal force of values and disvalues. The most obvious amon" pOs­
sible causal sequences is: 
lxplanaton, Reduced values or Lower 
factor 
 increased disvalues fertility 
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However, if value change is a consequence rather than a cause of lowerfertility, or a cause rather than a consequence of a particular explana­
tory factor, the predictions will still stand. All that the predictions sayis that, for an explanatory factor to account for lower fertility, it mustbe associated with particular value changes, whether as a consequence
of these changes, a direct cause of' them, or an indirect cause of them.
In interpreting values and disvalues of children as reflections of the 
fertility transition, I am not looking for any single, overall measure of
value, nor for any concept of total utility as applied to children. Al­
though such concepts have been successfully applied in the past (e.g.,
Townes and others, 1976), they involve sophisticated psychological
measurement inappropriate for large-scale surveys, are based on sub­jective value hierarchies that vary from person to person, and, as
 
summary measures, probably tell one less about how values change

than investigation of individual values does. I am interested not in
 
whether the total net value of a child changes in the fertility transi­
tion-I assume it does-but in whether and in what way specific values
and disvalues change. It is not the fact of a value-of-children transition 
but its specific nature that I seek to elucidate. 
METHOD 
On the basis of these predictions, the demand-related explanations fbr
the fertility transition will be evaluatd against synchronic survey data 
on the value of children from seven Asian countries and two Western
countries. The countries are Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, tile 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United States,
and West Germany. In each country, except West Germany, between 
1,000 and 3,000 currently married women were interviewed in 1975 
or 1976, as were a quarter to a half of all their husbands. The WestGerman sample was smaller, consisting of about 300 married women 
with one child. Two samples, the West German and the Indonesian, 
were not nationally representative. The West German sample was 
drawn from the state of Bavaria, and in Indonesia the sample waslimited to two ethnic groups, Javanese in Central Java and Sundanese 
in West Java. The remaining samples were designed to be nationally
representative and did in fact cover many remote, traditional villages.
Some samples excluded areas of insurgency, however. Table 3 sum­
marizes the characteristics of each sample.
Comparisons of values and disvalues will be made across countries
with different fertility levels. Longitudinal comparisons within coun­
tries would be preferable, but such data are not available. Using cross­
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sectional comparisons to test longitudinal propositions requires theassumption that all of the countries are involved in the same basic fer­tility transition process, though the stages they L'-ive reached and the
speed of their progress differ. The samples include three distinct groups of countries: ( I ) high-fertility countries, with crude birth rates(as of 1976) between 35 and 45 per thousand and gross reproduction
rates (as of 1973) between 2.500 and 3.250; (2) moderate-fertility
countries, with crude birth rates of 20 to 30 and GRRs of 1.250 to2.000; and (3 low-fertility countries, with crude birth rates of 10 to15 and GRRs of 0.750 to 1.000. In these comparisons, culture, his­tory, ethnicity, and other f'actors that may havc no intrinsic relationto stage in the fertility transition may obscure the differences amongthese groups or produce spurious ones. Turkey aside, all the high­fertility countries are Southeast Asian; those with moderate fertility
are two East Asian countries (Korea and Taiwan) and Singapore,

which has a Chinese majority; and the low-fertility countries are both
Western. With the limited number of countries to be compared, it is

not feasible to introduce other country-level variables as controls. To
provide Ifurther tests of the hypotheses, therefore, additional compar­isons will be made within countries.
 
First, the sampled cities and counties in Korea and regions in the
Philippines will be contrasted. These 
two countries were chosen for 
reasons of convenience. It was possible to group respondents by sample
area, and fertility estimates by area ( totJ fertility rates calculated bythe own-children method) were available from other sources.
Second, in each of the nine countries except West Germany two
groups of respondent:; will be contrasted. Those with two or fewer
living children who were limiting their families (i.e., who expressed thedesire to have no additional children and who were besides using con­traception) will be referred to as "low-parity limiters," and may be
considered the prototypic posttransitional group. Those with five or
more living children who did not indicate that they wanted fewer chil­dren and who were not limiting their families (i.e., they wanted more
children or they were not using contraception, or both) will be re­ferred to as "high-parity nonlimiters" and may be censidered the pro­totypic pretransitional group. These delinitions proved rather stringent:
each group comprised a small proportion of each country sample,
ranging from I to 23 percent (see Table 7). The size of the groups
varied, as expected, with fertility level, except for Turkey, which hadrelatively fewer nonlimiters and more limiters than expected. Exclud­ing other groups at intermediate parities and of less definite fertility 
TABLE 3 Characteristics of samples t)
0 
Country 
Number in sample 
Wives Husbands Sample coverage 
Age cri-
terion for 
wivesa 
Type of samplebPPS No. of 
or not stages Major strata 
Interview­
ing period 
Indonesia 
(Javanese) 
1,032 487 Javanese in Central 
Java only 
Up to 39 Noc 4 Urban, rural Mar.-Apr. 
1975 
Indonesia 
'Sundanese) 
1,002 496 Sundanese in West 
Java only 
Up to 39 Noc 4 Urban, rural Mar.-Apr. 
1975 
Korea 1,565 490 National, excluding Up to 39 
Cheju island and 
remote islands 
Nod 3 Seoul-Pusan, 
urban, rural 
Jan. 1976 
Philippines 1,691 382 National, excluding Up to 39 
Western Mindanao 
and small islands 
Yes 3 City of Manila, 
urban, rural 
Sept.-Dec. 
1975 
Singapore 977 491 National 15-40 Yes 2 Urban govt. hous- Oct. 1976-
Taiwan 2,217 1,023 National, excluding Up to 44 
aboriginal areas 
and remote islands 
Yes 3 
ing, other urban, 
suburban govt. 
housing, other 
suburban, rural 
27 clusters of 
townships grouped 
by urbanization, 
education, and 
fertility 
Mar. 1977 
Jan.-Apr. 
1976 
Thailand 2,614 1,311 National, excluding 15-39 No' 4 Four regions, Apr.-May 
four Muslim prov-inces and Northeast 
Bangkok 1976 
border areas 
Turkey 1,760 545 National Up to 39 Nod 4 18 strata defined Aug.-Sept. 
by urbanization 
and level of 
1975 
development 
United States 1,569 456 Coterminous U.S. 
excluding military 
reservations 
15-39 Yes 4 74 groups of Jan.-Apr. 
SMSAs and counties 1975 
homogenous in 
pop., pop. in major 
city, etc. 
West Germany 296 0 Bavaria Up to 32 f Yes 2 Cities, towns, Sept.-Nov. 
villages 1976 
PPS-probability proportional to size. 
SMSA-standard metropolitan statistical area.a For all samples, the female respondent had to be a currently married womanwith her. (If who met the age criterion and whose husband was livingthe husband was temporarily absent, the total expected duration of absence was not to exceed six months.) The samplesof husbands were chosen from among those whose wives were interviewed.b All samples were stratified, multi-stage samples utilizing systematic random selection or simple random selection. 
c Fixed numbers of units were selected at each stage.d Each stratum had a different sampling fraction. Fractional weight. were applied to keep the total number of respondents constant.e Urban areas were overrepresented by a factor of two. Fractional weights were applied to keep the total number of respondents constant.f Only women with one child were interviewed. 
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intentions should make it possible to observe vatluC and disvalue dif­
ferences in more "purified" Form. 
Of the three types of' comparison, the comparisons across countries 
are the most important ones, since transition theory applies primarilyto total societies. 7 Comparisons across individuals are often used in
studies of the determi nanuts of fertility, where many variables can be
measured oil samples of s t bstailtial size. Plresumably a l'actor that re­duces fertility levels in a society does not affect every potential child­bearer e(lually alld sillultaneously but must, after it has begu i to 
operate, prodUce fertility different ials at tile individUal level. If' thef'actor operates only ill the fertility transition (rather than being a
relatively permanelnt cause of"difterentials), however, its inllItICe will 
not be observed before it operates nor at'ter its effect has been com­
pletely difftlsed. Individual comparisons, therel'ore. may reiiiforcecross-national comparisons, but the lack of inrdividual contrasts ait a
 
particular stage in the tranlsitio 
 Idoes n1ot negate the a'perltion of aparticular f'actor. The comparisons across coin i ulities would be es­sentially l a llel to cross-national comparison1s if' thie coin muinities be­ing comnpared were homogenous cultural entities with sharp bo undaries,
or essentially parallel to individtal coin parisons (except for the ceCo­logical ef'ect) if' the coimniliities were essentially random groupings.Neither of' these is the case for the Philippine atnd Koreaan sample areasbeing compared, so that these comparisons are intermediate between
 
the other two types.

Some of' the contrasts between countries and between sample areas

will be described below as it' they involved changes over time. What is
 
meant, in each case, is that, f'rom these cross-sectional contrasts, longi­tudinal changes are being in ferred. in accordance with tile previously
stated assumption of a single basic fertility transition process that all
countries have been, are, or will be implica ted ill.The measures to be coin,ered come flrom1 a uniform set of' questions
used in each of' the surveys about values anid disvales attached to
children. Respondents answered open-ended questions on the advan­tages aiid disadvantages of' having children, as opposed to not having
children. Up to f'our answers were coded for each respondent by 
means of' detailed coding schemes (Angeles, 1978), which were then 
7 As Ronald Freedman ( 1975: 10) has written: "The problem is not why onecouple rather than another is at a particular place in the frequency distribution
of births in a society, but why the society as a whole has the particular fertilitydistribution that distinguishes it from another." 
8 Some questions were omitted in the German study. 
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collapsed into the more general categories shown in the Exhibit. Tile 
problems of applying coding schemes across cultures are considerable 
(see, e.g., Whiting, 1968), and complete agreement on detailed cate­
gories is difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, tile use of more general cate­
gories in this paper considerably increases the reliability of' results. 
Respondents also answered a variety of structured questions. They
rated 19 values as very important, somewhat important, or not ini­
portant reasons for having children. In addition they chose tb,- most 
important and the second most important from aiong nine general
life values and indicated whether these values were satisfied by having
children. Separate questions determined whether they expected various 
types of economic or practical help from their sons or daughters. On 
still other questions respondents rated the importance of different 
costs of' children. No questions are covered thalt deal with values and 
disvalues related to the desire for specific numbers of' children. These 
will be treated elsewhere. Although it is change in vales and disvalues 
specifically tied to nuimber that shoti d aff'ect fertility, general values 
and disvaluCs should also show particular trends if' the explanatory f'ac­
tors that have been discussed are in fact operative.
For most of' the measures, percentages of respondents giving particu­
lar answers will be reported. For the ratings of' reasons f'or having chil­
dren, however, percentages appeared, on examination, to be inappro­
priate. In a set of attitude items of' this sort, a halo effect often oper­
ates: respondents who wanted mure chiklren tended to rate all the 
reasons higher and respondents who wanted fewer children tended to 
rate all the reasons lower. To control f'or this effect and provide more 
mea ningftul comparisons consistent with the other measures, tile mean 
rating across the 19 items was determined fbr each respondent, and 
deviations f'roin this ican are reported instead. 
As will be seen below, using ratings adjusted in this fI'ashion prOduced
results comparable to those from the open-ended advantages and dis­
advantages questions. Raw ratings, on tihe other hand, generally did 
not show interpretable pat terns. The use of adjusted ratings may be justif'ied, from a theoretical perspective, by the focus in this paper on 
changes in the emphases g-iven to liff'er'enat values rather than on 
changes in the global net value of children. As relative rather than ab­
solute measures, the adjusted ratings Ire consistent with this focus. 
The open-ended questions about advantages and disadvantages of' 
children also provide relative rather than absolute measures. They
force comparisons between values, because some responses, but not 
more than a few, are usually expected by the interviewer and can 
24 
ordinarily be recorded to each question. The number of responses anindividual gives varies within a narrow range, because the survey
method demands some answer but does not facilitate unlimited prob­ing. The values mentioned are presuniably those most salient to the
respondeni, but degree of salience cannot be equated across respond­
ents. It may be more generally true that. in making wide-ranging cross­
cultural compairisons acros, groups who do attach some positive utilityto having children, it is easier and more meaningful to compare the
most i unM inc lit values that different individuals attach to children
than to attempt to quantify ai net value for each individual.
 
FINDINGS 
The different value and disvalue measures will be discussed not by type
of quest on but in the order of the hypotheses about the fertility tran­
sition to which they relate. I will consider in order vALues relevant tothe hypothesis of vanishing economic roles for children, valies relatingto the hypothesis of rising aspirations, values involved in the hvpoth­
esis of the emergence of the conjugal fa nily, values relevant to tile
cultural props hypothesis, and finally values reflecting on tile mor­
tality reduction hypothesis.
 
Vanishing economic roles for children 
Prediction EI, that economic benefits from children shotlId decrease,
was clearly supported by the data on advantages of children (Table 4).Three values -help in ho usework, help in old age, and financial andpractical hielp-declined in salience across countries as fertility fell.
)ata for wives and for husbands showed parallel declines. Help in
housework was sharply lower in Turkey and Thailand than in thePhilippines and Indonesia, and it slipped slightly lower still in the
moderate- and low-fertility countries. By contrast, help in old age de­
clined slightly in salience between high-fertility and moderate-fertility
countries, bUt declined much more sharply between inoderate-fertility
and low-fertility countries. The salience of financial and practical helpdeclined more Uniformly from high- to moderate- to low-fertility cotin­
tries, the case of Tirkey being the exception.

Among the rated reasons for having children, two involved

nomic contributions: eco­to work and help and to depend on when old.Both declined in importance across countries. To work and help re­
ceived positive ratings in the high-fertility countries, negative ratings(i.e., ratings below the mean for all ULies) in moderate-fertility coun­tries, and even more negative ratings in low-fertility countries. To de­
TABLE 4 Indicators of children's economic roles, by country and sex of respondents: 1975-76 
Indicator 
Country (crude birth rate, 1976 a )
Philip- Indo- Thai-
pines Turkey nesia land(41) (39) (38) (36) Korea (29) Taiwan (23) 
Singa-
pore(20) 
United 
States (13) 
West 
Germany(10) 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning advantagesHelp in housework 35Help in old age 44Financial, practical help 49 
Ratingsb of reasons for having childrenTo work and help 
.11To depend on when old 
.20 
Percentage expecting help from sonsHelp around house 83Support in old age 86Part of salary 67Contribution in emergencies 88Support for siblings' schooling 84 
Percentage expecting help from daughtersHelp around house 94Support in old age 85Part of salary 68Contribution in emergencies 88 
Support for siblings' schooling 84 (Number of respondentsc) (1,691) 
11 33 
43 60 
22 53 
.06 .06 
.24 .13 
65 81 
93 82 
77 60 
95 83 
87 81 
94 92 
81 77 
60 56 
85 81 
76 72 
(1,760) (2,034) 
9 3 
27 23 
54 26 
.04 -. 31 
.31 .08 
73 82 
89 85 
71 71 
92 87 
86 65 
96 84 
87 46 
68 59 
89 75 
83 59 
(2,614) (1,565) 
4 
30 
17 
-. 25 
.14 
68 
85 
76 
92 
83 
82 
39 
72 
88 
79 
(2,217) 
9 
41 
13 
-. 18 
.30 
39 
39 
38 
58 
44 
55 
31 
32 
49 
39 
(977) 
3 
7 
2 
-. 50 
-. 48 
85 
12 
29 
74 
13 
92 
11 
29 
73 
13 
(1,569) 
0 
10 
1 
-. 37 
-. 41 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
(296) 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning advantagesHelp in housework 
Help in old age
Financial, practical help 
31 
39 
53 
8 
44 
23 
16 
48 
56 
7 
28 
51 
2 
20 
22 
3 
30 
22 
4 
36 
11 
2 
8 
4 
na 
na 
na 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Country (crude birth rate, 1976 a) 
Indicator 
Philip-pines 
(41) 
Turkey 
(39) 
Indo-
nesia 
(38) 
Thai-land 
(36) 
Korea 
(29) 
Taiwan 
(23) 
Singa-
pore 
(20) 
United 
States 
(13) 
West 
Germany 
(10) 
HUSBANDS (continued) 
Ratingsb of reasons for having childrenTo work and help
To depend on when old 
Percentage expecting help from sonsHelp around house Support in old age
Part of salary
"ontribution in emergencies
StPport for siblings' schooling 
Percentage expecting help from daughtersHelp arou-nd house 
Support it,old age
Part of salary
Contribution in emergencies
Support for siblings' schooling 
(Numberofrespondentsc) 
.10 
.17 
86 
82 
61 
85 
83 
92 
80 
61 
84 
80 
(382) 
-. 04 
.24 
80 
88 
67 
88 
87 
91 
67 
27 
62 
67 
(545) 
.05 
.11 
89 
82 
52 
81 
81 
93 
81 
50 
80 
80 
(983) 
.06 
.28 
73 
78 
53 
87 
82 
92 
75 
49 
84 
77 
(1,311) 
-. 27 -. 30 
-. 13 .07 
82 67 
79 76 
63 62 
81 86 
60 79 
80 79 
43 29 
42 57 
66 80 
52 74 
(490) (1,023) 
-. 31 
.25 
33 
31 
29 
49 
35 
48 
25 
24 
43 
31 
(491) 
-. 46 
-. 51 
87 
12 
19 
66 
16 
90 
11 
18 
65 
15 
(456) 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
(0) 
na-not applicable to West German sample. 
a Source of crude birth rates: Population Reference Bureau (1976).
b Deviations from the mean rating assigned by each individual to all 19 reasons. Original ratings were on a scale from 1 (not important)
to 3 (very important).
 
Because of missing data, some percentages and means are 
based on slightly fewer respondents. 
C*N 
c 
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pend oil when old received positive ratings in high and moderate-fer­
tility countries, and strongly negative ratings in low-fertility countries.Expectations of nelp from sons and daughters also show'd declines.An average of about 80 percent of respondents expected each type ofhelp in the high-fertility countries. This dropped to about 75 percentin Korea and Taiwan and only 40 percent in Singapore. In the UnitedStates, the average was also about 40 percent. (These questions were
not asked in West Germany.) For specific expectations, the usutal pat­tern was Cor prolortions expecting that type of help from children tobe sharply lower in the two lowest-fertility countries, Singapore andthe United States. This was true fr ex)ecting children to contribute
 
part of their salary to the household and for expecting them to sup­port younger siblings through school. It was also true for expecting
sons to provide support in old age, but expecting daughters to provide
support in old age was lower not only in these two countries but alsoin the other moderate-fertility countries. For expecting help from chil­dren in emergencies, the pattern also held, except that the proportions
were higher in the United States than in Singapore. For expecting helpin housework, the pattern was different: some decline for moderate­fertility countries, but a subsequent rise in the United States. 9
 Similar declines appeared across Philippine regions (Table 5) and
Korean cities and counties (Table 6). Overall, the economic benefits

expected from children 
were less salient among the advantages of chil­dren in Korea than in the Philippines, and in both countries they were
less salient in areas of lower fertility. Help in housework was men­tioned by 49 percent of wives in Bicol (which had the highest fertility

among the Philippine regions contrasted), but by only 12 percent in
Manila, by II 
 percent in Hongchon county (with the highest fertility
among the Korean sample areas), but by 0 percent in Seoul. The de­
clines were not smooth from the highest to the lowest fertility level,however. Help in housework was about eq ually salient for most Philip­
pine regions, dropping sharply only for the two most developed re­gions. In Korea this value dropped sharply after Hongchon, and then
stayed constant at a low level. This finding agrees with the cross-na­
tional pattern of declines in the salience of' household help mainly be­
tween high and moderate fertility levels. For husbands, the declines 
9 One might also note, in this table, the differences in expectations of help from sons and from daughters, especially in Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. Moreover,there were systematic differences between wives and husbands: on the averageacross countries, the wives expecting help were over 5 percentage points morethan the husbands expecting help. 
00 
TABLE 5 Indicators of children's economic roles, by region and sex of respondents: Philippines,1975-76 
Region (total fertility rate, 1968a) 
South-
Min- East Central West Cenitral 
Indicator Bicol danao Visayas Luzon Cagayan Visayas 1visayas ern City of(7,015) (6,543) (6,348) (6,126) (6,058) Ilocos Tagalog Manila(5,929) (5,338) (5,243) (5,175) (3,349) 
WIVES
 
Percentage mentioning

advantages
Help in heusework 49 45 49 31 46 33Help in cld age 56 43 21 1251 17 41 41 23 45 34Financial, practical help 44 55 6751 43 59 56 62 54 52 60 42 33
 
Ratings tor reasons for having

children
To work and help 
.11 .18 .21 .07 .17 .08 .16To depend on when old .25 .09 -. 07
.21 .23 .30 .18 .22 .21 .27 .37 .15 .14Percentage expecting help from 
sonsHelp around house 85 82 88 81Support in old age 85 95 89 84 77 6786 75 99 83 92 93 94 90Part of salary 83 6371 58 74 72 77Contribution in emergencies 72 82 73 57 4391 72 .84 91 93 85 93 97 89 82Support for siblings'schooling 85 70 84 90 86 90 88 92 80 78Percentage expecting help from 
daughtersHelp around house 93 90 100 95 95 93 98Support in old age 96 93 8882 72 99 83 88Part of salary 67 56 68 93 93 91 82 7173 80 77 83Contribution in emergencies 90 69 88 93 81 60 4792 87 92 99 88 86 
Support for siblings'schooling 
(Number of respondents) 
82 
(130) 
72 
(125) 
99 
(69) 
83 
(201) 
88 
(84) 
93 
(239) 
93 
(172) 
91 
(77) 
82 
(545) 
71 
(49) 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning 
advantagesHelp in housework 
Help in old age 
Financial, practical help 
47 
59 
4.1 
31 
21 
52 
39 
39 
54 
24 
29 
45 
55 
32 
45 
35 
35 
65 
61 
28 
53 
50 
8 
75 
13 
53 
53 
8 
42 
17 
Ratings for reasons for having
childrenTo work and help 
To depend on when old 
Percentage expecting help from 
-. 01 
.20 
.13 
.06 
.29 
.29 
.00 
.05 
.22 
.26 
.05 
.21 
.17 
.36 
.27 
.27 
.12 
.14 
-. 08 
-. 25 
sonsHelp around house 
Support in old age 
Part of salary 
Contribution in emergencies 
Support for siblings'schooling 
Percentage expecting help from 
daughtersHelp around house 
Support in old age
Part of salary 
Contribution in emergencies 
Support for siblings'schooling 
(Number of respondents) 
a 
91 
82 
71 
79 
85 
100 
82 
68 
82 
82 
(34) 
69 
69 
52 
62 
59 
79 
65 
45 
59 
65 
(29) 
100 
100 
77 
100 
100 
100 
100 
85 
100 
100 
(13) 
87 
76 
50 
87 
92 
92 
68 
50 
84 
68 
(38) 
100 
73 
59 
95 
86 
95 
73 
68 
91 
73 
(22) 
99 
94 
78 
91 
93 
96 
94 
75 
88 
94 
(69) 
86 
92 
69 
86 
81 
86 
83 
69 
83 
83 
(36) 
100 
83 
83 
92 
92 
100 
83 
83 
100 
83 
(12) 
77 
79 
52 
85 
80 
92 
79 
53 
85 
79 
(117) 
67 
42 
17 
67 
67 
75 
50 
17 
67 
50 
(12)Calculated by Robert Retherford and others using the own-children method and data from the 1973 National Demographic Survey(personal communication). 
TABLE 6 Indicators of children's economic roles, by sample area and sex of respondents: Korea, 1976 
City or county (total fertility rate, 1974 a) 
Hong- Chang- Seong­chon Sosan Naju JonjuIndicator jinju nyong nam(4,873) (4,417) (4,080) (3,728) (3,707) Pusan Daegu Seoul(3,637) (3,518) (2,846) (2,578) (2,347) 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning 
advantagesHelp in housework 11 2 1 5 1 4Help in old age 30 27 45 34 1 1 2 028 29 17Financial, practical help 15 12 15 1028 21 41 29 19 44 20 17 27Ratings for reasons for having

children
To work and help 
-. 12 -. 36 -. 04 -. 28 -. 20 -. 08 -. 45To depend on when old .37 .12 .31 .19 .22 
-. 47 -. 38 -. 41
.33 -. 04 -. 18 -. 04 -. 10Percentage expecting help from 
sonsHelp around house 81 80 81 82 82 86 84 86Support in old age 77 8382 87 93 86 87 89Part of salary 68 88 84 74 8367 88 63 68 74 75Contribution in emergencies 79 89 91 89 75 62 7084 89 90 96 78 86Support for siblings'schooling 63 65 84 65 62 74 69 60 52 58Percentage expecting help from 
daughtersHelp around house 84 94 83 82 91 79Support in old age 38 51 52 36 91 87 73 8644 42 55Part of salary 50 60 68 47 63 54 38 4557 61 62 47Contribution in emergencies 56 79 84 72 82 65 65 83 81 73 77Support for siblings'schooling 59 64 62 50 62 59 58 55 45(Number of respondentsb) (95) (269) (77) (125) (143) (143) 
57 
(i46) (103) (146) (318) 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning 
advantagesHelp in housework 
Help in old age 
Financial, practical help 
Ratings for reasons for having
childrenTo work and help 
To depend on when old 
Percentage expecting help from 
7 
37 
26 
-. 23 
.15 
3 
18 
23 
-. 25 
-. 04 
3 
29 
18 
-. 22 
.37 
0 
33 
27 
-. 16 
-. 01 
0 
21 
28 
-. 19 
.08 
3 
27 
19 
.04 
.24 
2 
19 
27 
-. 46 
-. 17 
0 
14 
27 
-. 31 
-. 42 
3 
18 
13 
-. 17 
-. 27 
1 
9 
22 
-. 40 
-. 54 
sonsHelp around house 
Support in old age
Part of salary 
Contribution in emergencies 
Support for sibli,gs'schooling 
Percentage expecting help from 
daughtersHelp around house 
Support in old age 
Part of salary 
Contribution in emergencies 
Support for siblings'schooling 
(Number of respondentsb; 
86 
86 
70 
86 
76 
93 
48 
41 
69 
55 
(29) 
82 
80 
64 
85 
66 
84 
51 
51 
71 
63 
(89) 
65 
91 
73 
79 
71 
79 
41 
38 
59 
62 
(34) 
87 
69 
57 
74 
50 
70 
33 
30 
73 
43 
(40) 
79 
86 
55 
79 
52 
79 
31 
41 
69 
45 
(29) 
93 
90 
73 
83 
73 
71 
39 
46 
68 
54 
(41) 
85 
67 
58 
79 
60 
87 
33 
23 
63 
46 
(48) 
86 
73 
64 
86 
59 
82 
50 
55 
82 
50 
(22) 
64 
64 
56 
67 
44 
64 
41 
33 
46 
31 
(39) 
85 
77 
60 
79 
49 
79 
41 
43 
63 
48 
(119) 
a Calculated by Robert Retherford and others using the own-children method and 1975 census data (personal communication).b Unweighted. Since the weights for all respondents of a given sex in each city or county are identical, percentages and means are notaffected by weighting. 
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TABLE 7 Indicators of children's economic roles among high-parity 
1975-76 
Indicator 
WIVES
 
Percentage mentioning
 
advantages
 
Help in housework 
Help in old age 
Financial, practical help 
Ratings of reasons for 
having children 
To work and help 
To depend on when old 
Percentage expecting help 
from sons
 
Help around house 

Support in old age 

Part of salary 

Contribution in emer­
gencies 

Support for siblings'

schooling 
Percentage expecting help 
from daughters
Help around house 
Support in old age 
Part of salary 
Contribution in emer­
gencies 
Support for siblings' 
schooling 
(Number of respondents) 
(Respondents as per­
centage of sample) 
IUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning
advantages
Help in housework 
Help in old age 
Financial, practical help 
Ratings of reasons for 
having children 
To work and help 
To depend on when old 
Philippines 
HPN 
48 
40 
63 
.14 
.17 
89 
93 
82 
92 
93 

95 
92 
82 
92 
92 
(182) 
(11) 
41 
46 
66 
.12 
.12 
LPL 
21 
45 
40 
.06 
.13 
78 
86 
55 
80 
77 

95 
87 
60 
81 
83 
(92) 
(5) 
7 
50 
43 
.12 
.18 
Turkey 
HPN 
5 
54 
31 
.38 
.29 
80 
100 
85 
98 
100 

97 
92 
75 
92 
97 
(59) 
(3) 
4 

47 

19 

.23 
.44 
Indonesia 
LPL HPN LPL 
5 40 41 
41 60 38 
11 56 71 
-. 36 .09 .07 
.21 .14 .13 
45 83 73 
74 78 79 
45 58 74 
89 82 82 
68 82 88 
91 90 94 
63 73 79 
40 57 71 
80 82 82 
63 79 76 
(141) (260) (34) 
(8) (13) (2) 
1 18 28 
25 45 67 
16 59 39 
-. 27 .10 .06 
.18 .14 .12 
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nonlimiters and low-parity limiters, by country and sex of respondents: 
Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United States 
HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL 
14 
19 
70 
5 
26 
41 
13 
49 
8 
0 
10 
33 
5 
31 
24 
1 
19 
14 
18 
41 
23 
8 
27 
4 
6 
11 
6 
2 
6 
3 
.19 
.28 
-. 02 
.33 
-. 14 
.54 
-. 41 
-. 23 
.02 
.19 
-. 58 
-. 03 
.22 
.51 
-. 41 
.14 
-. 49 
-. 52 
-.48 
-.49 
88 66 90 81 75 52 52 27 83 83 
97 
87 
86 
62 
100 
85 
81 
69 
97 
97 
67 
65 
43 
57 
26 
22 
23 
53 
10 
28 
98 89 90 89 97 90 68 41 78 75 
97 76 74 60 97 71 57 27 22 11 
99 95 84 85 87 65 66 39 100 90 
93 
83 
84 
60 
37 
49 
46 
47 
47 
93 
43 
61 
23 
39 
20 
20 
23 
56 
10 
28 
95 88 64 77 93 86 50 34 78 73 
94 75 67 49 92 6C 41 25 17 11 
(160) (179) (40) (141) (60) (160) (44) (140) (18) (327) 
(6) (7) (3) (9) (3) (7) (5) (14) (1) (21) 
8 
24 
63 
9 
28 
39 
10 
47 
16 
3 
18 
25 
5 
40 
5 
0 
14 
26 
6 
53 
23 
3 
27 
10 
0 
25 
0 
2 
4 
4 
.13 .01 -. 28 -. 50 -. 12 -.42 -. 09 -. 54 -. 69 -.46 
.25 .27 .03 -. 37 .28 -. 18 .19 .16 -. 69 -.41 
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TAB L E 7 (continued) 
Philippines Turkey Indonesia 
Indicator HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL 
HUSBANDS (continued) 
Percentage expecting help
from sons 
Help around house 
Support in old age
Part of salary 
Contribution in emer­gencies 
Support for siblings'
schooling 
88 
95 
76 
88 
90 
87 
73 
47 
67 
53 
98 
100 
62 
100 
100 
76 
82 
40 
83 
71 
89 
84 
55 
86 
82 
78 
89 
72 
89 
88 
Percentage expecting help
from daughters
Help around house 
Support in old age
Part of salary 
95 
93 
75 
87 
80 
47 
100 
71 
21 
95 
65 
21 
93 
83 
53 
89 
89 
78 
Contribution in emer­gencies 
Support for siblings'
schooling 
85 
87 
73 
53 
48 
23 
58 
51 
85 
80 
89 
88 
(Number of respondents) 
(Respondents as percentage 
of sample) 
(41) 
1) 
(15) 
(4) 
(20) 
(4) 
(365) (134) 
(7) (14) 
(18) 
(2) 
HPN-high-parity nonlimiters. 
LPL-Iow-parity limiters. 
were parallel. Help in old age showed a tendency to rise instead of fall­
ing at the lowest fertility levels in the Philippines, but a more predict­
able decline was seen across Korean sample areas: the proportion of
wives mentioning this value ranged from 45 to 27 percent in the sixhigher-fertility areas, and from 17 to 10 percent in the four lower­
fertility areas. (Korean husbands showed a corresponding pattern.)
These patterns are, again, consistent with the cross-national pattern ofdeclines in the salience of old-age help between moderate and low fer­
tility levels. Salience of the third related value, financial and practicalhelp, was more consistent with predictions for the Philippines, where 
it declined for Manila, than for Korea, where little pattern could be 
discerned. 
On the structured questions, the patterns were also supportive of
the predictions. In the Philippine sample, the two economic reasonsfor having children did not vary consistently across most of the re­
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Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United States 
HPN LPL HPN LPL LPL LPLHPN HPN HPN LPL 
85 75 83 76 80 57 27 8328 8392 66 94 69 57 1895 44 23 1079 39 5589 90 37 17 5322 28 
98 79 94 79 100 75 67 30 78 75 
93 79 100 49 100 64 44 21 22 
 11
 
99 91 81 70
94 70 
 67 35 100 90
92 65 63 38 26 1530 28 23 10
75 34 35
77 85 31 6 56
21 28
 
97 75 73 61 69 29
85 61 78 73
 
91 71 89 47 90 44 17
55 21 11
 (92) (101) (12) (47) (20) (84) (18) (68) (8) (103) 
(7) (8) (2) (10) (2) (8) (4) (14) (2) (23)
 
gions, but dropped in importance for the metropolitan Manila area. Inthe Korean sample, these two reasons received lower importance rat­ings in the four lowest-fertility sample areas. The line, in both coun­tries, appeared to be drawn between larger urban areas, where these
economic reasons were discounted, and all other areas, where these 
economic reasons still held sway.
In regard to expectations of help from children, Manila residents 
generally had the fewest expectations, though expectations were also
relatively low in Eastern Mindanao. Expectations in Korea were at
roughly the same level as in the Philippines for sons, but at a lowerlevel for daughters. Among the Korean cities and counties, expecta­
tions were lowest in Daegu, with the second lowest fertility level, and
slightly higher in Seoul, with the lowest fertility level. 
Across individuals, Prediction E I also stood up fairly well (Table 7).Percentage difference2s on the open-ended question between high-parity 
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nonlimiters and low-parity limiters were interpreted only if they

reached or exceeded 
 10 percentage points. Most of the differences­
and some of them were quite large, exceeding 30 percentage points­
were in the expected direction, high-parity nonlimiters mentioning 
more economic benefits than low-parity limiters. The differences were 
most consistent for financial and practical help (the low-fertility
United States being one of the exceptions), than for help in old age(where differences were striking in the moderate-fertility countries 
and Turkey), and least for help in housework (where only the Philip­
pines showed differences for both wives and husbands).

On the structured measures, a striking difference was observed in
 
the moderate-fertility countries: limiters rated the two economic rea­
sons for having children considerably less important than did non­
limiters. This was partly true also in Turkey and Thailand. In regard 
 to
expectations of help, confirmatory differences exceeding 10 percentage
points (limiters expecting less help than nonlimiters) appeared in the 
majority of comparisons in each country, Indonesia being the only ex­
ception. The specific types of help expected that distinguished limiters 
and nonlimiters varied by country, by sex of child, and by sex of re­
spondent. Distinctions were sligntly more common, overall, on expect­ing children to contribute part of their salary to the household, on ex­
pecting them to support siblings through school, and on expecting sup­
port in old age, and slightly less common on expecting contributions in 
emergencies and expecting help around the house. 
Overall, therefore, Prediction El had excellent support, and the idea 
that vanishing economic roles for children is a factor in the fertility
transition was consistent with the data. This positive result can be read­
ily portrayed in a way that glosses over some of the inconsistencies in
 
the data. Figure I charts the salience, on the advantages question, of
 
two of the values, help in old age and financial and practical help,
 
across countries as fertility falls. What have been plotted are not the
actual percentages but smoothed figures, obtained by repeatedly taking
medians of every three successive values, with a special technique ap­
plied to end points (Tukey, 1977: 210-23). The decline in the salience
of economic benefits thus appears sharply delineated. 
The data also suggested that particular economic benefits decline in 
a specific pattern. Help in housework appears to decline earliest and,
when moderate fertility levels are reached, has little further room to 
decline. Help in old age does not decline substantially until the transi­
tion from moderate to low fertility levels begins. Financial and practi­
cal help, finally, declines contilnuously. The ability of each value to 
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FIGURE I Salience of help in old age and financial, practical 
help by fertility level, after smoothing 
60 
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practical help 
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NOTE: 	Smoothing involved repeatedly taking medians of 
three successive values (Tukey, 1977:210-23). 
distinguish individuals with a high-fertility pattern from individuals
with a low-fertility pattern can be deduced from the timing of thesedeclines. Financial and practical help differentiated these groups inhigh-fertility and moderate-fertility countries, help in old age was dif­ferentiating in moderate-fertility countries, and help in housework had 
some capacity to differentiate mainly in high-fertility countries. These patterns were more evident with the general questions than with ques­
tions about specific types of help expected. 
Rising aspirations 
Rising aspirations among parents should be reflected in four types of
value changes: increased concern with the restrictions children impose
on their parents, as the parents' extrafamilial involvements broaden; 
more awareness of the psychological benefits of having children, such 
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as tile opportunities for self-fulfillment and for satisfying new aspira­
tions to achievement and power through children; greater importance
being attached to thc-, financial costs, as parents' aspirations for the 
children themselves rise; and greater importance being attaclhed to the 
demands of childrearing, as parents attempt to do more for their Chil­
dren. Data relevant to each type of value change will be considered. 
Restrictionson )arents.Prediction P6 says that, because of rising as­
pirations, restrictions on parents should be more salient at lower fer­
tility levels. Two disvalues among the disadvantages of'children are rele­
vant, one having to do with work restrictions and the other a catchall 
for social, personal, and other restrictions: that children tie one down. 
Work restrictions were less salient, in every case, than the broad idea 
of being tied down (Table 8). Among husbands, work restrictions 
hardly varied in salience. But among wives, for whom work restrictions 
were higher in salience, they increased in salience at the low-fertility
end. Being tied down, on the other hand, increased in salience lroni 
high- to moderate-fertility countries, and then increased even more 
sharply from moderate- to low-fertility countries. The large differences 
in perceived restrictions appeared, therefore, at the low end of the fer­
tility continuum. 
To further determine sensitivity to restrictions, respondents were 
asked: "Would you say that having children prevents/would prevent 
you from doing other things you want to do very often, sometimes, 
or not at all'?" About 70 percent of wives and about 50 percent of 
husbands chose "very often" or "sometimes." West Gemlan wives and 
U.S. husbands were only slightly more likely than other wives and 
husbands to reply that children did interfere with other things. Unlike 
answers to the disadvantages question, the responses to this question
provided at best minimal support for the prediction of increasing re­
strictions with lower fertility. It was observed, however, that some re­
spondents, in replying to this question, had in mind chiidren interfering
with housework, which is a disvalue of children that should be dis­
tinguishied from restrictions on enjoyable or personally satisfying ac­
tivities (and was classified elsewhere in the coding scheme used). A 
way to identify these respondents was a follow-up question that asked 
what things children interfere with. Responses to the follow-up ques­
tion were coded according to the scheme used for disadvantages of 
children. Those respondents who specifically mentioned a sense of 
being tied clown (including specific personal or social restrictions) and 
inability to work were counted. The percentages for being tied down 
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appeared in accord with the prediction, being sharply higher in the twolow-fertility countries, though also somewhat high in Turkey. The per­
centages for work restrictions showed no clear trend. These results
 
were essentially identical to results obtailled from the disadvantages
 
question.
 
Across Philippine regions (Table 9), perceived restrictions on the dis­
advantages question actually appeared to fall slightly. Work restrictions 
were not mentioned at all by Manila respondents, and being tied down 
was least salient, among wives, in Manila (though it was quLite salient 
among huslands). For Korean cities and counties (Table 10), the sa­lience of restrictions showed no linear pattern. Responses 
 to the struc­
tured question also failed to show the expected trends, as (lid responses
to the follow-lp question. It'restrictions do increase in salience only atlow fertility levels, the absence of' Sulpporting trends across Philippine
and Kor,.an areas need not be taken as discouraging.
The nonlim iter-limiter comparisons, by contrast, led to confirmatory
results (Table I I ). Work restrictions, because they were generally solow in salien1ce on tile disadvantages question, did not produce largedifferences. ,Rut the other disvalue, being tied dc ,, n, differentiated 
limiters and nonlimiters neatly for both wives and husbands at moder­
ate and low fertility levels, as well as in Turkey -limiters mentioning
these restrictions more often-but not in the other high-fertility coun­
tries. The structured question too separated nonlimiters and limiters,
though mainly among wives rather than husbands. In Turkey, Singapore,
and the United States, limiter wives more often agreed that children 
prevented their doing othei things than nonlimiter wives. In all coun­tries except Indonesia and the Philippines, more limiter wives men­
tioned being tied down. Restrictions on work, however, seemed to
opa!rate in the reverse direction, wherever they made any difference. 
Aln alternate measure of the restrictions children impose is children'sfailure to satisfy vues a person considers important in life. One might
seek other sources of value satisfaction, which, giveli limitations on 
time and resources, would eventually compete with having children.
Respondents indicated whether children would or would not satisfy
the values they chose as most and second most important out of a list
of nine general values (Tables 8 to I I). The percentages who said chil­
dren would not provide value satisfaction were clearly higher (between
20 and 43 percent) in Singapore and the United States, at the low­fertility end, than in the other countries, where the figures ranged from3 to 16 percent. Across sample areas in the Philippines and Korea, how­
ever, no trends were evident. Between nonlimiter and limiter husbands 
TABLE 8 Indicators of rising a;pirations, by country and sex. 1975-76 
, 
0 
Indicator Philip-pines Turkey Indo-nesia Thai-land Korea Taiwai 
Singa-
pore 
United 
States 
West 
Germany 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning disadvantagesTied down 
Can't work 
Percentage saying children prevent theirdoing other things 
Percentagea mentioning being tieddown 
Perrentagea mentioning workrestrictions 
Percentage saying children do not 
7 
3 
74 
14 
19 
11 
4 
73 
72 
27 
15 
3 
69 
57 
11 
6 
6 
74 
13 b 
30 b 
26 
3 
66 
38 
25 
15 
1 
79 
24 
44 
30 
8 
59 
60 
21 
68 
8 
71 
87 
15 
80 
14 
89 
129 
12 
satisfyMosttheirimportant life-value 
Second most importan. life-value 
Percentage mentioning advantagesLiving through children 
Achievement, power
Character, responsibility 
Incentive to succeed 
Fulfillment 
Ratings of reasons for having childrenTo be remembered 
To make you proud 
To do something 
To watch them grow 
To look up to you
To be a better person 
8 
4 
4 
5 
2 
4 
1 
.01 
.01 
-. 14 
.06 
-. 25 
.03 
12 
12 
2 
10 
0 
1 
4 
.05 
-. 10 
-. 28 
.01 
-. 20 
-. 22 
8 
6 
6 
2 
0 
2 
0 
-. 16 
.00 
.01 
-. 01 
.13 
-. 18 
8 
7 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
-. 08 
.08 
u 
.12 
.12 
-. 05 
9 
10 
6 
33 
1 
3 
7 
-. 18 
.05 
.28 
.30 
-. 33 
-. 27 
6 
6 
2 
6 
0 
1 
4 
-. 11 
-.05 
.03 
.14 
.02 
-. 37 
30 
21 
1 
4 
1 
6 
4 
-. 48 
-. 18 
-. 21 
-. 02 
-. 14 
-. 57 
20 
23 
8 
40 
4 
0 
33 
-. 50 
.31 
.29 
.85 
-. 25 
.00 
na 
na 
7 
14 
10 
0 
36 
-. 56 
.14 
.81 
.27 
-. 04 
-. 54 
HUSBANDS
 
Percentage mentioning disadvantages
Tied down 7 9 7 3 18 9 19 59 naCan't work 2 3 1 3 1 0 3 1 naPercentage saying children prevent theirdoing other things 65 51 45 60 43 38 21 70 naPercentagea mentioning being tieddown 
 17 34 
 15 7 b 25 19 22 96 na 
Percentagea mentioning w"ork
restrictions 24 27 29 14 b 9 22 4 3 naPercentage saying children do not 
satisfy their 
Most important life-value 6 13 10 8 12 9 43 25 naSecond most important life-value 3 ., 6 7 14 10 26 27 na 
Percentage mentioning advantages
Living through children 4 3 9 2 10 4 3 12 naAchievement, power 3 10 2 1 36 4 4 36 naCharacter, responsibility 2 0 1 2 4 1 3 2 naIncentive to succeed 7 3 6 2 3 3 6 5 naFulfillment 3 5 0 1 8 5 3 21 na 
Ratings of reasons for having children 
To be remembered 
.02 .10 -. 09 -. 10 -. 16 -. 10 -. 58 -. 42 naTo make you proud 
.05 .r)9 -. 00 .11 .05 -. 08 -. 14 .41 naTo do something 
-. 11 -. 27 -. 00 u .30 .07 -. 15 .22 naTo watch them grow 
.07 -. 05 -. 00 .15 .38 .15 -. 06 .82 naTo look up to you 
-. 24 -. 04 .14 .12 -. 25 -. 01 -. 08 -. 17 naTo be a better person 
.06 -. 07 -. 10 .03 -.31 -. 36 -. 42 .11 na 
na-not applicable to West German sample, u-unavailable.
 
a Bases for percentages included those who said children did not prevent their doing other things. Multiple responses were 
coded. The tab­ulation program used (SPSS) counted two responses coded in the same category once each, even if both were from the same person,which explains why percentages may exceed those in the preceding row or may exceed 100.b Few Thai respondents answered this follow-up question, making these percentages artificially low. (Those who said children preventsome things but did not specify what they were were counted as missing, whereas those who said children do not prevent other thingswere not counted as missing.) If the percentages were adjusted for nonresponse, they would become 21 and 51 for wives and 20 and 43for husbands. 
TABLE 9 Indicators of rising aspirations, by region and sex: Philippines, 1975 
Indicator Bicol Min-danao EastVisayas CentralLuzon West CentralCagayan Visayas Visayas Ilocos 
South­ernTagalog City ofManila 
.WIVES 
Percentage mentioning
disadvantagesTied down 
Can't work 
Percentage saying children pre­vent their doing other things 
Percentage mentioningbeing tied down 
Percentage mentioning workrestrictions 
Percentage saying children do 
5 
3 
84 
9 
20 
7 
0 
89 
8 
32 
4 
6 
71 
3 
34 
3 
2 
71 
13 
16 
24 
8 
74 
49 
24 
9 
4 
81 
23 
30 
12 
5 
88 
18 
30 
5 
1 
88 
34 
15 
3 
1 
62 
5 
7 
2 
0 
59 
2 
4 
not satisfy theirMost important life-value 3 
Second most important life­value 5 
Percentage mentioning 
advantagesLiving through children 4Achievement, power 4Character, responsibility 0Incentive to succeed 5Fulfillment 1 
Ratings of reasons for having
childrenTo be remembered 
-. 01To make you proud 
-. 03To do something 
-. 16To watch them grow 
.05To look up to you 
-. 22 To be a better person 
.10 
8 
6 
5 
7 
2 
9 
1 
.07 
-. 01 
-. 13 
-. 02 
-. 01 
.19 
9 
5 
5 
8 
0 
3 
0 
.04 
-. 55 
-. 23 
-. 05 
-. 18 
-. 05 
9 
5 
4 
3 
4 
5 
3 
-. 00 
-. 02 
-. 07 
.11 
-. 17 
.02 
17 
9 
1 
6 
1 
5 
0 
.20 
.04 
-. 27 
.02 
.20 
-. 04 
12 
5 
5 
5 
3 
4 
0 
-. 01 
.03 
-. 14 
.05 
.10 
-. 09 
11 
4 
6 
8 
1 
6 
0 
.05 
.03 
-. 23 
.01 
.03 
.02 
3 
0 
7 
3 
0 
0 
0 
.12 
-. 06 
-. 21 
.03 
.11 
.15 
4 
2 
2 
6 
2 
4 
2 
-. 04 
.09 
-. 12 
.11 
-. 67 
.03 
11 
9 
4 
4 
0 
0 
4 
.02 
.14 
.01 
.18 
-. 60 
-. 05 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning 
disadvantagesTied down 
Can't work 
Percentage saying children pre­vent their doing other things 
Percentage mentioningbeing tied down 
Percentage mentioning workrestrictions 
Percentage saying children do 
6 
0 
65 
18 
32 
4 
4 
89 
21 
64 
8 
8 
61 
0 
25 
6 
0 
64 
9 
14 
5 
5 
95 
81 
19 
10 
3 
68 
19 
21 
8 
3 
81 
17 
56 
0 
8 
67 
25 
33 
4 
1 
52 
6 
10 
25 
0 
0 
0 
0 
not satisfy theirMost important life-value 
Second most important life­value 
Percentage mentioning 
4 
5 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
5 
11 
5 
6 
3 
0 
0 
6 
4 
9 
0 
advantagesLiving through children 
Achievement, power
Character, responsibility
Incentive to succeed 
Fulfillment 
Ratings of reasons for having
childrenTo be remembered 
To make you proud 
To do something 
To watch them grow
To look up to you
To be a better person 
0 
3 
0 
6 
3 
-. 01 
-01 
-. 01 
.05 
-10 
.20 
3 
7 
3 
14 
3 
-. 07 
.06 
-. 18 
-. 01 
-. 07 
.20 
0 
0 
8 
23 
0 
.21 
-. 40 
-40 
-. 02 
-. 25 
.14 
11 
3 
3 
5 
0 
.03 
.08 
.00 
.19 
-18 
.13 
9 
5 
0 
0 
5 
.02 
-. 11 
-17 
.07 
.16 
.02 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
-01 
.08 
-. 09 
.01 
.01 
.02 
14 
6 
0 
3 
6 
.14 
.06 
-. 19 
-. 05 
-11 
.09 
0 
0 
8 
0 
8 
.25 
-. 27 
-. 25 
.17 
.08 
.08 
2 
4 
0 
8 
3 
-. 00 
.10 
-10 
.09 
-. 63 
.03 
0 
0 
17 
17 
0 
-. 25 
.33 
-. 08 
.33 
-42 
-. 33 
TABLE IC Indicators of rising aspirations, by sample area and sex: Korea, 1976 
Indicator Hong-chon Sosan Naju Jonju Jinju Chang-nyong Seong­nam Pusan Daegu Seoul 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning
disadvantagesTied down 
Can't work 
Percentage saying children preventtheir doing other things 
Percentage mentioning beingtied down 
Percentage mentioning workrestrictions 
Percentage saying children do not 
17 
1 
54 
30 
27 
28 
2 
63 
43 
16 
20 
5 
73 
23 
43 
47 
4 
74 
54 
26 
11 
5 
64 
26 
33 
23 
4 
59 
19 
26 
27 
7 
73 
39 
35 
36 
1 
68 
56 
20 
19 
1 
59 
41 
19 
26 
3 
72 
43 
29 
satisfyMosttheirimportant life-value 
Second most important life­value 
Percentage mentioning advantagesLiving through children 
Achievement, power
Character, responsibility 
Incentive to succeed 
Fulfillment 
Ratings of reasons for having
children
To be remembered 
To make you proud 
To do something 
To wlich them grow 
To look up to you 
To be a better person 
11 
9 
8 
35 
0 
1 
2 
-. 07 
-. 05 
.09 
.20 
-. 31 
-. 38 
11 
12 
2 
36 
2 
2 
8 
-. 22 
.08 
.32 
.29 
-.33 
-. 31 
5 
3 
9 
43 
0 
5 
13 
-. 04 
.12 
.12 
.21 
-. 24 
-. 04 
7 
11 
7 
48 
0 
0 
4 
-. 12 
.08 
.34 
.35 
-. 44 
-. 32 
7 
5 
5 
21 
1 
1 
14 
-. 16 
-. 01 
.26 
.25 
-. 36 
-. 22 
3 
6 
12 
30 
0 
2 
4 
.15 
-. 08 
.10 
-. 01 
-. 22 
-. 16 
12 
1C 
6 
38 
1 
9 
7 
-. 31 
.04 
.34 
.39 
-. 24 
-. 23 
11 
10 
7 
25 
2 
2 
12 
-. 32 
.06 
.39 
.41 
-. 37 
-. 32 
10 
14 
5 
29 
1 
4 
5 
-. 21 
.02 
.22 
.33 
-. 33 
-. 25 
10 
11 
6 
32 
2 
2 
7 
-. 30 
.15 
.39 
.39 
-. 41 
-. 34 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning
 
disadvantages
Tied down 

Can't work 

Percentage saying children preventtheir doing other things 

Percentage mentioning being
tied down 
Percentage mentioning workrestrictions 
Percentage saying children do not 
satisfyMosttheirimportant life-value 
Second most important life­value 
Percentage mentioning advantagesLiving through children 
Achievement, power 
Character, responsibility 

Incentive to succeed 

Fulfillmant 
Ratings of reasons for having 
childrenTo be remembered 

To make you proud 

To do something 

To watch them grow 

To look up to you

Tobeabetterperson 
7 
0 
50 
32 
11 
17 
14 
4 
48 
0 
4 
0 
-. 02 
.15 
.22 
.15 
-. 23 
-. 54 
31 
1 
39 
22 
11 
10 
10 
8 
39 
5 
5 
6 
-. 27 
.11 
.33 
.37 
-. 29 
-. 30 
9 
3 
36 
12 
18 
3 
6 
6 
23 
0 
6 
6 
.16 
.02 
.19 
.25 
-. 13 
-. 28 
20 
0 
45 
30 
7 
10 
15 
7 
30 
3 
15 
-. 08 
-. 06 
.27 
.39 
-. 29 
-. 24 
11 
0 
39 
29 
7 
14 
10 
7 
28 
10 
0 
10 
-. 26 
-. 13 
.25 
.36 
-. 23 
-. 40 
16 
0 
33 
21 
8 
12 
15 
19 
38 
5 
0 
5 
.22 
.02 
-. 00 
.19 
.02 
-13 
15 
4 
40 
15 
10 
13 
13 
15 
31 
36 
8 
17 
-. 38
.12 
.35 
.50 
-. 27 
-. 36 
20 
0 
63 
42 
11 
9 
18 
2332 
9 
0 
14 
-37
.01 
.46 
.42 
-. 23 
-. 23 
13 
0 
34 
23 
3 
23 
10 
1541 
3 
3 
5 
-01 
-. 04 
.12 
.35 
-. 24 
-. 16 
17 
1 
53 
31 
5 
13 
20 
938
 
3
 
3 
11 
-. 24
.10 
.47
 
.49
 
-. 35 
-. 39 
4 
46 
TABLE 11 Indicators of rising aspirations among high-parity non-
Philippines 
Indicator HPN LPL 
WIVES
 
Percentage mentioning

disadvantages

Tied down 5 8Can't work 3 2 
Percentage who say childrenprevent their doing other things 77 75 
Percentage mentioningbeing tied down 11 12 
Percentage mentioning workrestrictions 24 17 
Percentag saying children do 
not satisfy theirMost important life-value 11 11 
Second most importantlife-value 3 7 
Percentage mentioning
advantagesLiving through children 4 1 Achievement, power 4 5Character, responsibility 1 4Incentive to succeed 2 4Fulfillment 2 1 
Ratings of reasons for having
childrenTo be remembered 
.37 .02To make you proud 
-. 16 .18
To do something 
-. 44 -. 24To watch them grow 
-.12 .07To look up to you -. 25 -. 13To be a better person 
-. 49 -. 20 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning
disadvantages
Tied down 5 0Can't work 3 17 
Percentage saying children prevent their doing other things 68 47 
Percentage mentioningbeing tied down 17 13 
Percentage mentioning
work restrictions 23 33 
Turkey 
HPN 
6 
2 
59 
49 
30 
8 
1 
3 
3 
0 
0 
0 
-. 17 
.04 
.02 
-. 02 
.13 
-. 17 
0 
0 
28 
22 
19 
Indonesia 
LPL HPN LPL 
19 15 0 
6 1 0 
77 72 56 
93 60 38 
16 10 18 
12 10 3 
16 3 9 
2 4 6 
15 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 2 6 
6 1 0 
-. 14 .00 .02 
.10 -. 05 .03 
.01 -. 12 -.24 
-. 08 .08 .08 
.15 -. 16 -.42 
-.05 .04 .04 
20 
3 
5 
1 
0 
0 
37 56 F5 
31 17 12 
7 37 41 
47 
limiters and low-parity limiters, by country and sex: 1975-76 
Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United States 
HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL 
3 8 15 38 9 26 21 37 33 80 
1 5 0 3 0 0 0 10 0 7 
67 71 67 74 90 79 35 70 44 77 
6 19 30 55 13 37 26 76 50 95 
26 23 37 25 63 36 17 24 11 18 
7 9 3 16 2 10 19 41 37 25 
4 9 8 11 2 10 16 17 9 26 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
1 
2 
1 
7 
46 
0 
0 
2 
4 
33 
2 
5 
10 
2 
3 
0 
0 
2 
1 
13 
1 
1 
6 
2 
2 
0 
11 
0 
2 
3 
1 
9 
6 
6 
61 
6 
0 
33 
11 
40 
4 
1 
33 
-. 01 
.01 
u 
.07 
.07 
.05 
-. 18 
.16 
u 
.20 
.10 
-. 11 
-. 01 
.09 
.02 
.22 
-. 38 
-. 19 
-. 33 
.13 
.38 
.47 
-.40 
-. 33 
-. 06 
-. 06 
-. 03 
.02 
.02 
-. 21 
-.26 
.02 
.10 
.27 
.01 
-. 50 
-.OV 
-. 08 
-. 30 
-. 06 
-. 08 
-. 37 
-. 59 
-. 16 
-. 19 
.11 
-. 09 
-. 64 
-. 55 
.15 
.37 
.70 
-. 18 
-. 07 
-.50 
.30 
.29 
.86 
-.26 
-.04 
3 5 0 23 0 13 22 21 50 67 
2 4 0 6 0 0 11 2 0 3 
46 72 37 49 60 37 22 25 100 72 
2 16 32 36 20 27 17 24 100 92 
15 23 6 8 35 18 6 5 13 5 
48 
TABLE 11 (continued) 
Indicator 
Philippines 
HPN LPL 
Turkey 
HPN LPL 
Indonesia 
HPN LPL 
HUSBANDS (continued) 
Percentage saying children do 
not satisfy theirMost important life-value 8 
Second most important life­
value 5 
Percentage mentioning 
advantages
Living through childen 15 
Achievement, power 0Character, responsibility 2 
Incentive to succeed 10 
Fulfillment 2 
Ratings of reasons for having
children 
To be remembered 
-. 03 
To make you proud 
.13 
To do something 
-. 39 
To watch them grow .18 
To look up to you 
-. 02 
To be a better person 
-. 50 
21 
7 
0 
0 
0 
7 
0 
-. 12 
.40 
-. 30 
'10 
-. 17 
-. 06 
7 
9 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-. 04 
.02 
.02 
-. 01 
.11 
-. 12 
16 
3 
7 
11 
0 
2 
11 
.01 
-. 10 
-. 05 
-. 05 
.18 
.06 
6 
9 
9 
4 
0 
5 
0 
.10 
.10 
-.07 
.07 
-. 15 
.07 
27 
6 
11 
0 
0 
6 
0 
.05 
.12 
-.28 
.05 
-. 22 
-. 15 
u-unavailable.
 
HPN-high-parity nonlimiters. 
 LPL-low-parity limiters. 
in the countries with lower fertility, there was a tendency for the latterto say, more often than the former, that children did not satisfy basic
values. Among wives the comparisons were less consistent. 
The overall pattern was clear and compelling: prediction P6 was
supported but should be qualified in two ways. First, general restric­
tions on parents' activities did increase in salience, but not until lowerlevels of fertility were attained. Thus comparisons within countries athigh and moderate fertility levels failed to show consistent differences,
and comparisons among individuals also failed in high-fertility coun­
tries. In countries with lower fertility, on the other hand, comparisonsbetween individuals did show differences in perceived restrictions. A
second qualification was that work restrictions, when separated from
other restrictions, showed on one question a slight upward trend for
wives only at low fertility levels, but generally did not vary much. 
These results are illustrated in Figure 2, obtained by smoothing thedata (Tukey, 1977:210-23) on perceived restrictions from the dis­
advantages question. 
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Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United States 
HPN LPL HPN HPN HPN
LPL LPL LPL HPN LPL
 
8 11 10 8 0 20 29 43 0 28 
3 8 10 11 16 11 17 28 0 33 
0 3 10 10 5 6 0 6 13 170 1 32 37 5 11 6 0 25 280 3 6 8 0 0 0 4 0 32 1 6 1 0 6 6 6 13 40 3 11 15 5 11 0 4 13 23 
.06 -. 19 .14 -. 18 .08 -. 14 -. 31 -. 67 -. 69 -.42
.10 .14 .25 .15 -. 07 -.07 .02 -. 14 .31 .38 
u u .15 .51 .03 .06 -.09 -. 24 .56 .19
.13 .23 .05 .48 -. 02 .25 -. 15 .93.05 .84

.12 .14 .09 -. 38 .03 -. 01 .02 -. 18 -.44 -. 22
.08 -. 03 
-. 34-. 17 -. 37 -. 41 -. 37 -. 37 .18 .04 
Psychologicalappreciation.Prediction P3 says that, as a consequence
of rising aspirations, various psychological appreciation values should 
become more prominent. These values are diverse. Of the five codedfrom the advantages question (Table 8), aspirations should relate least
equivocally to achievement and power motives, which should rise, and 
to the desire for self-fulfillment, which should also rise. Arguments
could be made to link the other values to aspirations too, but these ar­
guments would probably be more circuitous. All of the five values 
were less salient than economic benefits and rewarding interactions, ex­
cept in the low-fertility count!ies (cf. Tables 4 and 16). Across high­
and moderate-fertility countries there was no trend in these values, but
the salience of a few values increased sharply for low-fertility countries.Self-fulfillment, in particular, was considerably more salient at the low­fertility end among both wives and husbands. Achievement and power 
were also relatively salient in the United States for both sexes, although
they were equally salient in Korea. Character and responsibility were 
somewhat higher in low-fertility countries among wives. 
50 
80 
FIGURE 2 	Salience of being tied down, by fertility level,
 
after smoothing
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A slightly different set of six psychological appreciation values was 
among those rated in importance as reasons for having children. The 
trends in these values across countries were not consistent. Three 
values related to achievement, power, or self-fulfillment-to make you
proud, to do something, to watch them grow-were more highly rated 
in the low- than in the high-fertility countrie:,. Two other values-to be 
remembered, to be a better person-dropped in ratings at lower fer­
tility levels. The last value-to look up to you---showed no trend. Being
remembered and becoming a better person might be considered essen­
tially status-related or social-reward values rather than personal-devel­
51 
opmlnt values. In that case, these valutes would reflect changes in cul­tural norms more than changes in personal aspirations. With these twovalues excluded, the remaining psychological appreciation values do 
support some rise in aspirations.
Across Philippine and Korean sample areas there was little discerniblepattern in the salience of the open-ended responses. Small trends thatappeared were not consistent across the sexes. Among tie value ratingsthere were some differences. Across Philippine regions, becomiing a bet­ter person and being remembered had lower ratings illManila for hus­bands, but not for wives. Of the remaining values, two to make youproud and to watch them grow were slightly more highly rated inManila, but one to look up to you- was mLuch lower in ratings in bothManila an1d Southern Tagalog. Across Korean cities and counties, beingremembered dropped in ratings at lower fertility levels, but becominga better person did not. 01' the remaininl valuties, Soie slight rise in
ratings appeared for two to do something and to watch them grow.
The comparisons across co1munities on the structured questions,
therefore, resembled the comparisons across countries: 
being remem­bered and becoming a better person declineld with lower fertility, bUtsome of the other values rose in ratings. These results, however, were
 
less clear-cut.
 
Between high-parity nonlimiters and low-parity limiters the differ­ences on 
 the advantages (ItIestion were few and scattered, though prob­ably not random. For instance, limiters among both wives and hus­bands in Turkey mentioned achievement or power more often thannonlimiters. The other differences appeared only f'or one sex and not
the other. Among the ratings, being remembered was more important
for nonlimiters in the majority of cases, and becoming a better personwas also generally more important among nonlimiters, though therewere more exceptions. Of the other values, one- to watch then grow­was definitely more important among limiters. Two others -to
you protid and to do something make
 were more important among limiters
for wives only. For htislands the reverse 
was slightly more likely.Prediction P3 has some weak support. Partictir psychological ap­preciation ",alues did increase in salience at low fertility levels across
countries. Among tile advantages of' having children, sel fuml fillinentrose in salience (Figure 3 represents this in smoothed fashion), as didachievement and power. Among rated valtues, to watch children grow,to make you proud, and to do somnething (valtes related to achieve­merit, power, and self-fulfillment) rose in importance, and also distin­guished individuals with lower fertility, which other values did not. 
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FIGURE 3 Salience of fulfillment by fertility level, after 
smoothing 
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Two of the structured values-being remembered and becoming a bet­
ter person-appeared to be more group-oriented rather than personal, 
and consistently gave contradictory results. That there is some, even 
slight, effect in the predicted direction could be taken as encouraging. 
It is not being argued, after all, that these effects produce the fertility
transition. In fact, they operate in the reverse direction, and merely in­
dicate that aspirations relevant to having children do change. 
Financialcosts. Both the rising aspirations factor and the conjugal fam­
ily factor imply that financial costs of children rise in the fertility tran­
sition, in the first case because aspirations for children rise and in the 
second case because costs are borne more directly by parents. Predic­
tions P4 and S4, therefore, are identical. If costs can be shown to rise 
at lower fertility levels, either one or both of these factors may be the 
explanation. 
Referring to Table 12, we find, however, that costs did not rise. Re­
sponses on the open-ended question specially mentioning the cost of 
education were separated from responses mentioning other costs, these 
others, in the aggregate, being substantially more common. Concern 
with these other costs neither increased nor decreased across fertility 
levels. Concern with the cost of education, on the other hand, actually
decreased from high-fertility countries to moderate- and low-fertility 
53 
countries. '[his contradicts both predictions, but cannot be taken as anisolated finding. Using the same question on disadvantages, Arnold and
others (1975:52) found financial costs to be less salient in Japran andHawaii and more salient in Korea, Taiwan, tile Phililplines, and Thai­land, even when respondents were divided into urban iniddle-class, ur­ban lower-class, and rural groups.
Within the Phililpines across regions (Table 13 ), Iinancial costs wereleast salient am1r1t0l1 disadvantages in the iik-hest-f'ertility region and in­
creased in salience as fertility Cell, though they t'ell again in salience inlthe lowest-lL'rtility regions. Within Korea (Table 14). the trend was to­
ward fewer responses mentioning I'inancial costs at lower levels of' f'er­tility, particularly in the cities of Seoul, DaeUl, and PtI an. The cost of
education Specifically also showed a sligllt decline. These patterns heldfor both wives and husbanls. It does seem clear that the salience of 
perceived costs, on this measure, did not rise andI,most probably, ac­
tually t'ell.
 
Moving to the individual level provides even 
more striking discon­firmation of the predictions (Table 15). Particularly among husbands-­
who ill each country mentioned costs a0101g diSadvantages more often
than wives but also among wives, fewer low-parity limiters than high­parity nonliiniters mentioned financial costs. A large percentage dif­ference in this lirection appeared in five countries among husbands, intwo countries among wives. The differences appeared equally in high­fertility countries, in moderate-fertility Cotun tries, and in low-fertility
countries. Similar differences appeared in Korea for the cost of educa­tion. Respondents limiting their families showed less concern with f'i­
nancial costs than those not limiting their families.

How might these results be interpreted? One possibility is that the

salience of fin ancial cost, 
 depends not on the absolute level o0'such
costs but on their level relative to in 2ome. Since incomes are usuallyhigher in low-f'ertility areas, the perceived cost of' children may actuallydecline. In relation to the schema presented earlier, we miht say that
observations of' the eff'ects of' the higher aspirations factor and the 
emergence of' the conjugal f'amily f'actor are complicated by the simul­taneous operation of the higher incomes factor. This interpretation
would account for the pattern across countries and across regions, butit implies that the effects of these two f'actors on perceived costs of
children are not strong enough to overcome the effect of' the incomesf',etor, and therefore cannot by themselves explain the fertility transi­tion. (These two factors have, however, other effects, some still to be
considered, which conceivably could be stronger.) A structured question 
TABLE 12 Perceptions of financial costs of children and childrearing demands, by country and sex of
respondents: 1975-76 
Indicator Philip- Indo- Thai- Singa- United West 
pines Turkey nesia land Korea Taiwan pore States Germany 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning financial costs 
among disadvantages
Cost of educatioi, 
Other financial costs 
12 
35 
6 
41 
13 
46 
3 
17 
6 
31 
1 
35 
1 
44 
2 
42 
0 
19 
Percentage saying a couple should have 
More children than they can afford(if they want them) 
Only the number they can afford 
Fewer than they can afford 
2 
78 
20 
1 
81 
18 
6 
65 
29 
3 
74 
23 
4 
58 
38 
1 
21 
79 
0 
35 
65 
8 
87 
6 
na 
na 
na 
Percentage considering three childrento be some financial burden 54 81 56 80 85 67 83 70 98 
Percentage mentioning childrearing
demands among disadvantages
More work 
Emotional strain 
Health, pregnancy 
Discipline 
Chilo's sickness 
Worry over child's future 
Other childrearing problems 
2 
26 
3 
52 
15 
4 
14 
33 
23 
7 
24 
15 
4 
0 
18 
20 
1 
22 
60 
5 
5 
3 
5 
3 
7 
6 
1 
14 
0 
15 
1 
27 
15 
9 
8 
33 
68 
0 
15 
9 
5 
0 
19 
-7 
0 
39 
0 
0 
0 
6 
24 
1 
9 
6 
7 
1 
10 
34 
1 
0 
0 
0 
12 
Percentage saying children causemoderate oi 3 lot of worry and strain 68 78 78 67 61 88 61 72 76 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning financial costs 
among disadvantagesCost of education 
Other financial costs 
12 
39 
13 
55 
14 
58 
4 
25 
6 
43 
2 
41 
1 
58 
4 
47 na na 
Percentage saying a couple should have 
More children than they can afford(if they want them) 
Only the number they can afford 
Fewer than they can afford 
Percentage considering three childrento be some financial burden 
Percentage mentioning childrearing 
demands among disadvantages
More work 
Emotional strain 
Health, pregnancy 
Discipline 
Child's sickness 
Worry over child's future 
Other childrearing problems 
3 
74 
23 
41 
1 
26 
2 
55 
18 
4 
14 
1 
86 
13 
82 
13 
9 
1 
22 
8 
7 
0 
4 
73 
23 
48 
9 
16 
0 
24 
49 
6 
4 
3 
79 
19 
74 
3 
6 
1 
8 
4 
1 
11 
6 
54 
40 
84 
0 
12 
0 
19 
15 
8 
11 
1 
17 
82 
66 
17 
65 
0 
19 
5 
5 
0 
0 
33 
67 
77 
7 
53 
0 
36 
0 
0 
0 
7 
81 
12 
66 
325 
1 
1 
6 
7 
2 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
Percentage saying children cause 
moderate or a lot of worry and strain 63 59 73 58 51 80 38 61 na 
na-not applicable to West German sample. 
TABLE 13 Perceptions of financial costs of children and childrearing demands, by region and sex of 
respondents: Philippines, 1975 
Indicator 
WIVES 
Bico! Min-danao EastVisayas CentralLuzon West CentralCagayan Visayas Visayas Ilocos 
Sou th­
ern City ofTagalog Manila 
Percentage mentioning finan­
cial costs among disadvantagesCost of education 
Other financial costs 
Percentage saving a couple
should have 
14 
24 
12 
34 
18 
54 
5 
24 
6 
40 
17 
49 
17 
46 
5 
36 
12 
29 
12 
26 
More children than they canafford (if they wanti hem) 1 
Only the number they canafford 73Fewer than they can afford 26 
Percentage considering three
children to be some financialburden 42 
Percentage mentioning child­
rearing demands among
disadvantagesMore work 0Emotional strain 33 
Health, pregnancy 5Discipline 72Child's sickness 10Worry over child's future 5Other childrearing problems 11 
Percentage saying children cause 
moderate or a lot of worry andstrain 61 
3 
51 
46 
61 
2 
25 
22 
30 
34 
2 
9 
78 
6 
62 
32 
52 
9 
31 
0 
46 
21 
6 
10 
61 
1 
83 
16 
61 
1 
19 
3 
50 
8 
4 
14 
67 
2 
82 
16 
61 
4 
68 
1 
36 
15 
5 
18 
71 
1 
95 
3 
50 
5 
32 
1 
44 
17 
4 
24 
77 
2 
34 
64 
67 
2 
29 
4 
47 
30 
2 
10 
80 
7 
68 
25 
79 
0 
12 
1 
52 
3 
3 
16 
81 
2 
92 
7 
44 
1 
18 
1 
64 
10 
5 
11 
58 
2 
93 
4 
61 
0 
9 
0 
53 
5 
7 
14 
62 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning finan­
cial costs among disadvantagesCost of education 
Other financial costs 
Percentage saying a couple 
19 
16 
14 
61 
15 
69 
6 
18 
5 
57 
10 
59 
19 
53 
25 
42 
8 
21 
25 
37 
should have 
More children than they canafford (if they want them) 
Only the number they canafford 
Fewer than they can afford 
Percentage considering three 
children to be some financialburden 
Percentage mentioning child­
rearing demands among 
disadvantagesMore work 
Emotional strain 
Health, pregnancy 
Discipline 
Child's sickness 
Worry over child's future 
Other childrearing problems 
Percentage saying children cause 
moderate or a lot of worry andstrain 
0 
62 
38 
23 
6 
31 
0 
47 
6 
6 
19 
67 
15 
30 
55 
48 
4 
25 
11 
21 
46 
4 
4 
83 
0 
69 
31 
69 
8 
23 
0 
39 
31 
0 
15 
54 
0 
87 
13 
42 
0 
15 
3 
70 
9 
9 
18 
66 
9 
77 
14 
64 
5 
62 
0 
48 
24 
5 
19 
86 
1 
91 
7 
32 
0 
35 
0 
47 
15 
6 
18 
65 
6 
31 
63 
58 
0 
19 
0 
56 
39 
0 
11 
61 
17 
50 
33 
75 
0 
8 
0 
33 
0 
0 
8 
58 
2 
87 
11 
34 
0 
20 
2 
72 
11 
4 
12 
53 
0 
75 
25 
25 
0 
0 
0 
63 
25 
0 
0 
67 
00 
TABLE 14 Perceptions of financial costs of children and childrearing demands, by sample area and sex LAof respondents: Korea, 1976 
Hong-Indicator Chang- Seong­chon Sosan Naju Jonju Jinju nyong nam Pusan Daegu Seoul 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning financial 
costs among disadvantagesCost of education 11 7 8 3 5 9 6Other financial costs 34 2 3 530 41 53 37 32 37 23 22 22Percentage saying a couple
should have 
More children than they canafford (if they want them) 5 4 7 4 4 8 2 5 1 3Only the number they c:ziafford 58 51 55 74 71 59 65Fewer than they can afford 37 45 39 22 25 33 53 63 5833 42 36 40 
Percentage considering three chil­dren to be some financial burden 93 82 79 78 91 78 91 86 81 91Percentage mentioning childrear­
ing demands among disadvantagesMore work 0 0 0 0 0 1 0Emotional strain 0 0 112 18 16 11 17 15 17 9 16Health, pregnancy 0 0 140 1 0Discipline 1 1 1 1 135 25 50 35 33 41 17 14 20Child's sickness 217 21 15 21 15 17Worry over child's future 5 19 13 13 119 20 12 15 9 7Other childrearing problems 4 10 43 9 13 21 4 9 6 3 7 6Percentage saying children cause 
moderate or a lot of worry andstrain 71 64 71 61 51 53 63 59 44 62 
HUSBANDS
 
Percentage mentioning financial 
costs among disadvantagesCost of education 

Other financial costs 

Percentage saying a couple
 
should have
 
More children than they can
afford (if they want them)Only the number they can 
afford 
Fewer than they can afford 
Percentage considering three chil­dren to be some financial burden 
Percentage mentioning childrear­ing demands among disadvantagesMore work 

Emotional strain 

Health, pregnancy 

Discipline 
Child's sickness 
Worry over child's future 
Other childrearing problems 
Percentage saying children cause 
moderate or a lot of worry andstrain 
15 

48 

0 
59 
41 
85 

0 
7 
0 
26 

11 
11 
7 
59 

3 
49 

5 
47 

48 

83 

0 
11 

0 
17 

14 

7 
11 
52 

12 

56 
21 
29 
50 

81 

0 
12 

0 
44 

18 

21 
15 

47 

0 
50 

5 
55 

40 

76 
0 
15 

0 
23 
20 
15 

30 

60 

11 

41 
0 
69 
31 
80 

0 
7 
0 
22 

19 

11 

4 
31 
8 
42 

5 
54 
41 
80 

0 
18 
0 
24 
13 

8 
18 

37 

4 
50 

6 
58 

35 

92 

0 
13 
0 
17 

23 
4 
8 
52 

0 
30 

5 
55 

41 
89 
0 
10 
0 
10 

10 

0 
0 
73 
3 
30 
6 
33 
0 
72 
28 
6 
6 
61 
33 
83 85 
t 
13 
3 
13 
13 
11 
8 
0 
10 
0 
10 
12 
4 
8 
47 51 
60 
TABLE 15 Perceptions of financial costs of children and childrearing 
country and sex: 1975-76 
Indicator 
Philippines 
HPN LPL 
Turkey 
HPN LPL 
Indonesia 
HPN LPL 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning finan­
cial costs among disadvantages
Cost of education 
Other financial costs 
Percentage saying acouple
should have 
More children than they can 
afford (if they want them)
Only the number they can 
afford 
Fewer than they can afford 
Percentage considering three 
children to be some financial burden 
Percentage mentioning child­
rearing demands among
disadvantages
More work 
Emotional strain 
Health, pregnancy 
Discipline 
Child's sickness 
Worry over child's future 
Other childrearing problems 
Percentage saying children 
cause moderate or a lot of 
worry and concern 
13 
37 
3 
78 
19 
40 
1 
25 
3 
51 
16 
1 
12 
73 
16 
26 
1 
80 
19 
89 
3 
19 
5 
52 
17 
6 
14 
65 
4 
27 
3 
79 
18 
51 
18 
27 
4 
29 
8 
0 
0 
77 
9 
32 
0 
79 
21 
93 
30 
25 
6 
27 
9 
4 
0 
74 
13 
47 
6 
71 
23 
43 
22 
23 
1 
16 
64 
5 
5 
81 
12 
so 
6 
59 
35 
82 
12 
9 
C 
29 
68 
9 
3 
79 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning finan­
cial costs among disadvantages
Cost of education 
Other financial costs 
Percentage sa; ing a couple 
should have 
More children than they can 
afford (if they want them) 
Only the number they can 
afford 
Fewer than they can afford 
10 
35 
8 
82 
10 
17 
25 
0 
67 
33 
10 
126a 
0 
93 
7 
8 
45 
0 
92 
8 
14 
65 
5 
75 
20 
11 
56 
6 
61 
33 
Percentage considering three 
children to be some financial burden 15 93 67 99 30 78 
61 
demands among high-parity nonlimiters and low-parity limiters, by 
Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United StatesHPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL 
3 1 23 4 0 0 016 14 38 23 33 29 49 
0 0 1 
40 44 38 
9 1 8 3 3 0 0 0 11 8 
80 73 53 57 44 10 61 1711 26 39 89 8440 53 90 39 83 0 8 
65 90 83 93 39 77 70 86 11 79 
5 2 0 0 26 28 13 20 6 63 5 21 15 43 65 614 61 17 292 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 18 40 15 15 204 36 50 0 119 11 16 5 11 0 00 3 13 6 98 7 517 11 10 3 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 
63 69 65 54 90 83 55 66 67 76 
3 3 32 2 019 25 53 24 60 
2 0 0 0 345 50 53 63 47 
14 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 9 
75 81 84 52 2111 18 16 48 79 
2 78 21 87 8296 22 
 79 0 
 9
 
58 87 90 90 58 85 39 84 25 75 
62 
"ABLE 15 (continued) 
Philippines Turkey Indonesia 
Indicator HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL 
HUSBANDS (continued) 
Percentage mentioning child­
rearing demands among
disadvantages
More work 
Emotional strain 
3 
28 
0 
42 
26 
5 
14 
7 
13 
17 
6 
17 
Health, pregnancy 
Discipline
Child's sickness 
0 
57 
13 
8 
50 
50 
0 
2 
0 
2 
27 
13 
0 
19 
42 
0 
22 
55 
Woiry over child's future 3 0 0 5 6 11 
Other childrearing problems 5 17 0 0 4 0 
Percentage saying children 
cause moderate or a lot of 
worry and strain 81 73 31 40 74 61 
HPN-high-parity nonlimiters. 
LPL-low-parity limiters. 
a 	 The tabulation program used (SPSS) counted two responses coded in the same category 
once each, even if both were from the same person, which explains why percentages may 
exceed 100.
 
provides a limited test of this interpretation. Respondents were asked: 
"Do you think a couple should have mnore children than the' can af­
ford if they want them, should they have onl' the number of children 
they can afford, or should they have fewer than that?" This question 
provides some control for differences in income level. Relatively few, 
between 0 and 8 percent, chose "more children." The highest percent­
ages, in a complete reversal from the expectation, were in the United 
States. Between 6 and 82 percent chose "fewer children," and, again 
contrary to the expectation, the lowest percentages were in the United 
States. The percentages choosing "fewer" were considerably higher in 
the moderate-fertility rather than the high-fertility countries, a finding 
requiring further comment below. 
Across sample areas within the Philippines and Korea, no real trend 
could be detected. If anything, those contending that couples should 
have fewer children than they can afford decreased with lower fertility, 
but this was only a marginal tendency. Across individuals, the situation 
was different. Limiters were consistently more likely than nonlimiters 
to insist that couples have fewer children than they can afford. This 
was especially true in the moderate-fertility countries, but also true in 
other cases. 
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Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United States 
HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL 
2 0 0 0 10 17 0 9 0 43 13 16 18 75 57 56 48 25 32
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 03 13 42 18 10 26 61 50 0 7
9 3 20 18 5 7 0 0 0 4
 
0 1 0 4 5 2 6 0 0 515 7 26 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
52 67 58 58 100 85 28 43 63 64
 
Apart from this last finding, the idea that rising incomes mask a real 
increase in perceived costs was not supported. The last finding, that 
limiters were more likely to favor restricting childbearing relative to in­
come, suggests that perceived costs may be a factor in differential fer­
tility at the individual level, though it does not tie differences in per­
ceived costs to the fertility transition. A second interpretation of the 
failure of perceived costs to increase may be considered next. 
When considering the disadvantages of children, individuals may
keep different numbers of children in mind. Those with large families 
may be thinking of the disadvantages of many children, those with 
small families of the disadvantages of only a few children. To investi­
gate this possibility, respondents were asked whether they considered 
specific numbers of children to constitute some financial burden. The 
percentages of those who thought that three children constituted some 
financial burden bore little resemblance to percentages for the salience 
of financial costs. We would expect these percentages to show some re­
lation to fertility levels, rising at lower levels. This was not uniformly
the case. Almost all of the West German wives considered three chil­
dren a burden, as compared with about half of the Philippine and Indo­
nesian respondents. However, for the other low-fertility country, the 
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United States, the corresponding percentages were only 70 percent for 
wives and 66 percent for husbands, less than in four other countries 
with higher fertility. The greatest perceived financial burden seemed to 
be at moderate fertility levels, 10 which parallels the resuilts on the pre­
vious (UeStiOl. It may be possible to argue that the perceived burden 
of children rises sharply at an early stage in the transition, but a con­
tinuing rise beyond the early stage is clearly not indicated. 11 
Across Philippine regions the highest percentages of respondents 
considering three children to be a burden were in the llocos region, 
with relatively low but not the lowest fertility. In Korea, too, there 
was an absence of the expected pattern. Across individuals, however, 
the situation was sharply different. In every case except one, there 
were large differences between high-parity nonlimiters and low-parity 
limiters, with the latter much more likely to consider three children a 
financial burden. Among husbands in Turkey, for instance, there was a 
difference of 32 percentage points between limiters and nonlimiters 
who considered three children a burden. (In contrast, fe'wer limiters 
than nonlimiters mentioned financial costs as a disadvantage of chil­
dren, and the difference between them was over 50 percentage points.) 
Or again, among U.S. husbands, 50 percentage points more limiters 
than nonlimiters considered three children a burden (versus 16 percent­
age points fewer limiters who mentioned financial costs). 
These contradictions between the meIasures lend support to the idea 
that, when respondents mentioned financial disadvantages, they had 
different numbers of children in mind. With number of children con­
stant, the data indicated a negative link between the perception of 
costs and individual fertility. The data did not support any link be­
tween the perception of costs and area-wide or country-wide fertility 
levels. Unlike the two previous predictions from the rising aspirations 
factor, Prediction P4 (and the identical Prediction S4) are discon­
firmed, and, overall, perceptions of the financial costs of children ap­
pear not to rise in the fertility transition (Figure 4). 
10 Arnold and others (1975:43--47) found a similar pattern with smaller, selected 
samples in six countries. Hawaii and Japanese respondents were less likely to 
perceive three children as a heavy financial burden, Korean respondents were 
much more likely to do so, and Thai and Taiwanese respondents were in be­
tween. Philippine respondents, however, fell outside the pattern, being the 
least likely to consider three children a heavy burden. 
11 If one looks, alternatively, at the percentages who considered two or four chil­
dren to be some financial burden, the patterns are no more supportive of the 
predictions. 
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FIGURE 4 Salience of general financial costs and emotional 
strain by fertility level, after smoothing 
Wives 
Husbands 
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Time ­
childrearigdemands. As with financial costs, childrearing demands
should becomne heavier if either the rising aspirations factor or the Con­jugal family factor is operative. Predictions P5 and S5 Must thereforebe considered together. Seven disvalues among those coded from thedisadvantages question are classified under childrearing demands. Theemotional strain of childrearing is the one that Should most clearly beaffected. Greater ambitions for children and greater closeness to themshould mean more tension in caring for them, though not necessarily
more actual work. Some orfthe other disvalues, like concern with chil­dren's sickness, should actually decrease in salience for other reasons.Generally there were only slight trends in these disvalues on theopen-ended question (Table i2). Emotional strain did become moresalient, but it was highest at moderate fertility levels and about as sa­lient at high and at low fertility levels. Two disvalues, sickness and 
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worry about discipline, dropped considerably in salience, though not 
consistently. Both disvalues were lower in salience at the low-fertility 
end, but at the high-fertility end their salience was quite variable. An­
other disvalue, concerns tied to tile mother's health or to pregnancy,
had low salience to begin with and practically disappeared as a concern 
at moderate and low fertility levels. Another way of looking at the 
data is to consider which of these seven disvalues was most salient in 
each country. In the high-fertility countries either children's sickness 
or discipline was generally most salient. In the moderate- and low-fer­
tility countries (except for Korea), emotional strain was the most sa­
lien t. 
A similar pattern could not be found across Philippine or Korean 
sample areas. For the Philippines, emotional strain declined slightly 
across regions, as did concern with the additional work children re­
quire. The other disvalues did not change in salience. The most fre­
quently mentioned of' these disvalues in most areas was disciplinary 
problems. For Korea, discipline clearly declined in salience and an­
other disvalue, worry over the child's future, showed a possible de­
cline. As with the cross-national patterns, there was no clear support 
for the predictions. 
The comparisons between nonlimiters and limiters were no more 
enlightening. For wives, emotional strain was more salient among
limiters in Taiwan and tile United States, but among nonlimiters in 
Indonesia. For husbands, emotional strain was more salient among 
limiters in the lhilippines and Thailand, but among nonlimiters in 
Taiwan. Discipline and sickness were not consistently higher in salience 
for either limiters or nonlimiters. 
One structured question provides further negative evidence. Re­
spondents indicated how much worry and emotional strain childien 
cause. From 38 to 88 percent admitted at least a moderate amount of 
worry and strain, but these ratings showed no consistent variation 
across fertility levels. whethe r comparison s were made across coun­
tries, within countries, or Ibetween individuals. 
None of the disvalues under childrearing demands provided satis­
factory support for the predictions. There was some indication thi, 
emotional strain, by itself, increased in salience, particularly illcorn­
parison with such disvalues as discipline and sickness, and particularly 
in moderate-fertility countries (Figure 4). As with financial costs, re­
spondents may assess childrearing demands illrelation to tile number 
of children they expect, prefer, or are more familiar with. The ten­
dency for emotional strain to be more salient among limiters than 
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nonlimiters might have been stronger if all respondents had the same
number of children in mind. It appears, then, that two predictionsfrom the rising aspirations factor are confirmed but two others are not, 
a discrepancy to be discussed in the concluding section. 
Emergence of the conjugal family 
The shift from extended families to conjugal families should have two
effects on values and disvalues: costs are shifted directly onto the par­
ents rather than being borne by the kin group as a whole, and enmo­tional attachments within the fainily are intensified. It has just been
shown that the first of these effects cannot explain the transition;

costs and childrearing demands were not perceived as heavier at lowertertility levels. The second effect is related to two predictions, S2 andS7, which will now be considered. 
Rei'ardinginteractions, Prediction S2 says that companionshilp from

children and the niarital bond should increase in prominence. Ifthis
hap pens, the valutIe of children should rise; nevertheless, this effect

would indicate that the conjugal fain ily factor, which also has reverse
effects, is operative. The four rewarding-interactions values coded fromthe advantages q uestioii may be examined (Table 16). The coin panion­
ship and lov: that children provide increased in salience from high-fer­tility to 'noderate-furtility to low-fertility coun tries, as predicted. The
trend was clearer and stronger among husbands (as might be expected

where men are more strongly affected by depersonalization of occupa­tional roles), but also appeared among wives. The values of happiness
and play, fun, and distraction that children bring are related to com­
panionship but are more diff icLlt to interpret. For three countries,happiness was not reported as an answer; it was either not mentioned
 
or was coded in 
a more specific category, occasionally Under play, fun,
and distraction. When happiness and play, fun, and distraction wereconsidered together rather than separately, a rise in salience appearedfrom high- to moderate-fertility countries (though the Philippine re­
spondents also mentioned these values often), followed by a slight dropin salience fr,.i mnioderate- to low-fertility coun tries. The last value inthis set, children strengthening the marital bond, showed the predicted
rise, more notably between moderate- and low-fertility countries.In contrmst t.)the clarity with which predictions were supported
across countries, across regions within countries the patten's were lessclear. In the Philippines, the marital bond was more salient in Manilathan elsewhere (Table 17). None of the other values showed this trend, 
TABLE 16 
Indicator 
WIVES 
Indicators of the emergence of the conjugal family, by country and sex: 1975-76 
Philip- Indo- Thai- Singa- United 
pines Turkey nesia land Korea Taiwan pore States 
West 
Germany 
0 
Percentage mentioning advantagesCompanionship, love 
Happiness 
Play, fun, distractionMarital bond 
Ratings rf reasons for having childrenNot to be lonely 
To be needed 
To bring love 
Fun 
1 o complete family
Marital bond 
Percentage mentioning marital strainsamong disadvdntages 
13 
49 
1910 
.11 
-. 09 
.20 
.14 
.10 
.19 
1 
23 
0 
2215 
.21 
-. 43 
.13 
.16 
.17 
.17 
14 
19 
99 
.05 
-. 16 
.09 
.08 
.07 
.11 
1 
12 
8 
24 
-. 03 
-. 03 
.13 
-. 06 
.08 
.06 
U 
25 
47 
117 
.30 
.09 
.18 
.21 
.. 
.08 
4 
37 
0 
6911 
.26 
-. 26 
.07 
.13 
.27 
.04 
1 
41 
69 
1521 
.57 
.14 
.16 
.24 
.56 
.34 
1 
54 
0 
49 32 
-. 00 
.33 
.93 
.65 
.34 
-. 01 
6 
31 
49 
0 
28 
-. 02 
.35 
.82 
.89 
.24 
.26 
1 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning advantagesCompanionship, iove 
Happiness 
Play, fun, distraction 
Maritai bond 
Ratings of reasons for having childrenNot to be lonely
To be needed 
I o bring love 
Fun 
To complete family
Marital bond 
Percentage mentioning marital strainsamong disadvantages 
na-not applicable to West German sample. 
13 
48 
17 
11 
.05 
-. 10 
.19 
.13 
.13 
.21 
1 
12 
0 
29 
11 
.07 
-. 36 
.10 
-. 07 
.08 
.11 
3 
10 
15 
8 
12 
-. 02 
-. 11 
.08 
.06 
.03 
.10 
1 
5 
9 
2 
6 
-. 07 
-. 05 
.07 
-. 09 
.13 
.08 
0 
22 
45 
3 
18 
.30 
.04 
.27 
.23 
.28 
.15 
8 
22 
0 
65 
12 
.29 
-. 28 
.12 
.15 
.32 
.08 
1 
25 
74 
18 
32 
.51 
.13 
.08 
.27 
.65 
.40 
1 
41 
C 
4.4 
35 
-. 08 
.20 
.92 
.67 
.43 
.13 
7 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
n 
na 
na 
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i'owever, and companionship actually appeared to decline in salience. 
Ir Korea, a slight decrease for companionship and increase for the mar­ital bond with lower fertility appeared, but neither was unambiguous 
(Table 18).
Across individuals within countries the patterns were Supportive of
the predictions (Table 19). In three out of eight countries, a large dif­ference appeared among wives between high-parity nonlimiter3 and low­
parity limiters on the companionship value, and in one other countrythe difference was almost large enough to be noted. In each case thedifference was in the predicted direction. Among husbands, however,
the differences were as predicted only for Turkey; for moderate- andlow-fertility countries, the differences were reversed, low-parity limit­
ers mentioning this value less often than high-parity nonlimiters. It
should be noted that the comparisons among husbands were based onfewer cases, and were less reliable. For the two values of happiness andplay-fun-distraction, all the large percentage differences among wives
and all but one of' these differences among husbands were in the pre­dicted direction. For the last value in this set, the marital bond, one
discon firming instance again appeared among husbands (in the United
 
States), but generally low-parity limiters among both wives and hus­
bands mentioned this value more often.
 
Generally similar results could be found from structured questions.
Six rewarding interactions values were rated: 
not to be lonely, to bringlove, to be needed, fun, to complete the family, and to strengthen the
marital bond. The ratings for these values generally went up at lowerfertility levels. Wives' ratings for fun, for instance, were between 
-. 06 
and .16 in the high-fertility countries, between .13 and .24 in the
moderate-fertility countries, and between .65 and .89 in the low-fertility
countries. Not all the patterns were as convincing as this: to bring love
 
rose very sharply, but only at low fertility levels; not to be lonely and
 
to complete the family were 
higher at moderate than at low fertilitylevels; and the marital bond was surprisingly low in the United States.Overall, nevertheless, some rise in the importance of rewarding inter­
actions was evident. 
Across Philippine regions, similar trends could not be found. The
only noteworthy aspect was that Manila husbands gave particularlyhigh ratings to three values, to bring love, to complete the family, and 
to strengthen the marital bond. Across Korean cities and counties, a
slight upward trend could be found in two values, to bring love and tobe needed, and a firmer upward trend in the marital bond value. 
The nonlimiter-limiter comparisons strongly supported the prediction. 
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TABLE 17 Indicators of the emergence of the conjugal family, by region and sex: Philippines, 1975 
Indicator Bicol 
Min-
danao 
East 
Visayas 
Central 
Luzon 
West Central 
Cagayan Visayas Visayas Ilocos 
South­ern 
Tagalog 
City of 
Manila 
C 
WIVES 
Percentage mentionioig advantagesCompanionship, lcve 
Happiness
Play, fun, distraction 
Marital bond 
Ratings of reasons for having childrenNot to be lonely 
To be needed 
To bring love 
Fun 
To complete family
Marital bond 
Percentage mentioning marital strains 
among disadvantages 
20 
49 
17 
8 
.08 
-. 18 
.18 
.18 
.15 
.15 
1 
25 
57 
22 
14 
.18 
-. 08 
.25 
.19 
.08 
.23 
2 
9 
71 
12 
6 
.11 
-. 05 
.34 
.28 
.20 
.20 
1 
8 
47 
16 
5 
.08 
-. 13 
.19 
.15 
.08 
.18 
1 
11 
56 
15 
15 
.20 
-. 04 
.19 
.23 
-. 02 
.20 
1 
22 
57 
15 
7 
.04 
-. 12 
.16 
.09 
.08 
.16 
3 
12 
41 
24 
5 
.10 
-. 17 
.19 
.17 
.10 
.26 
1 
8 
55 
10 
3 
.29 
-. 09 
.25 
.30 
.01 
.18 
1 
10 
41 
23 
14 
.11 
-. 04 
.18 
.06 
.14 
.18 
2 
10 
61 
20 
20 
.16 
-. 11 
.20 
.14 
.10 
.20 
2 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning advantagesCompanionship, love 
Happiness 
Play, fun, distraction 
Marital bond 
Ratings of reasons for having childrenNot to be lonely 
To be needed 
To bring love 
Fun 
To complete family 
Marital bond 
Percentage mentioning marital strains among disadvantages 
27 
44 
3 
6 
-. 04 
-. 10 
.26 
.08 
-. 01 
.23 
0 
17 
72 
14 
24 
.06 
-. 18 
.24 
.24 
.17 
.24 
11 
8 
61 
39 
8 
.29 
-. 09 
.29 
.29 
-. 02 
.21 
0 
3 
58 
21 
5 
.16 
-. 16 
.21 
.19 
.16 
.21 
0 
5 
45 
'4 
27 
.16 
.07 
.25 
.21 
.07 
.16 
0 
23 
55 
17 
4 
-. 01 
-. 11 
.05 
.10 
.08 
.08 
0 
8 
33 
28 
6 
-. 19 
-. 19 
.23 
.20 
.'3 
.34 
0 
17 
58 
8 
17 
.33 
.09 
.17 
.25 
.08 
.08 
0 
9 
39 
11 
10 
.04 
-. 07 
.18 
.03 
.16 
.22 
2 
8 
33 
50 
50 
.17 
-. 17 
.42 
.25 
.33 
.42 
0 
TABLE 18 Indicators of the emergence of the conjugal family, by sample area and sex: 
Korea, 1976
Indicator Hong- Chang- Seong­
chon Sosan Naju jonju .inju nyong nam Pusan Daegu Seoul 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning advantagesCompanionship, love 27 31 16 19 24 33 27 19 24 20
Happiness 
 43 41 43 56 38 
 57 56 42 54
Play, fun, distraction 49
Mar'lal bond 0 1 3 2 2 1 3 14 20 16 14 11 17 4 1 
Ratings of reasons for having children 
19 19 19 17
 
Not to be lonely 
.43 .34 .09 
 .32 .29

-o be needed 
-. 01 .33 .36 .28 .28 .27.01 .14 .00 .04 .08 .10To bring love .26 .15 .17
.07 .15 .06 .23 .18Fun 
.22 .21 .12 .25 .21 .00 .16 .41 .22 .26
To complete family .10 .21 .18 .27 .26

.30 .32 .29 .49 .34
Marital bond .33 .21 .29 .40 .26-. 03 .08 -. 01 -. 02 .04 -. 04 .17 .17 .21 .12Percentage mentioning marjtdi strainsamong disadvantages 0 4 1 11 2 2 5 7 4 4 
HUSBANDS
 
Percentage mentioning advantages
Companionship, love 
 30 24 21 20 21
Happiness 38 21 18 21 16
37 34 35 55 35 54 60
Play, fun, distraction 36 31 58
0 5 6 
 0 7 0
Marital bond 6 0 10 27 16 23 30 
 10 5 21 
 14 18 23
Ratings of reasons for having childrenNot to be lonely 
.39 .38 .05 .39 
 .19 .29 .35To be needed .14 .30 .31
-. 06 -. 00 .17 -. 01To bring love -. 02 -. 00 -. 11 .14 .37 .04.05 .35 .02 .24 .22 .17Fun .25 .37 .19.25 .26 .40
.02 .12 .25
To complete family .04 .33 .28 .17 .31

.22 .30 .05 
 .37 .39
Marital bond .34 .23 .29 .22 .30
.15 .05 .14 .07 
 .16 -.15 .25 
 .28 .27 .25
Percentage mentioning marital strinsamong disadvantages 
 4 
 9 9 17 4 3 
 8 5 
 5 7
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TABLE 19 Indicators of the emergence of the conjugal family among 
1975-76 
Philippires Turkey Indonesia 
Indicator HPN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPI 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning 
advantages
Companionship, love 
Happiness 
Play, fun, distraction 
Marital bond 
11 
42 
11 
5 
20 
62 
24 
13 
27 
0 
8 
13 
31 
0 
23 
17 
10 
20 
7 
7 
9 
12 
0 
12 
Ratings of reasons for having
children 
Not to be lonely 
To be needed 
To bring love 
Fun 
To complete family
Marital bond 
.06 
-. 10 
.17 
.11 
.08 
.17 
.16 
-. 1i 
.16 
.16 
.12 
.21 
.04 
-. 58 
-. 06 
.14 
.27 
-. 09 
.25 
-. 43 
.38 
.21 
.34 
.33 
.03 
-. 19 
.08 
.08 
.04 
.10 
.01 
-. 20 
.13 
-. 02 
.07 
.10 
Percentage mentioning marital 
strains among disadvantages 2 3 2 1 1 0 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning 
advantages
Companionship, love 
Happiness 
Play, fun, distraction 
Marital bond 
12 
34 
10 
5 
7 
50 
21 
50 
2 
0 
8 
15 
24 
0 
41 
19 
10 
16 
11 
7 
17 
6 
11 
6 
Ratings of reasons for having
children 
Not to be lonely 
To be needed 
To bring love 
Fun 
To complete family
Marital bond 
.02 
-. 02 
.10 
.02 
.02 
.05 
-. 08 
-. 02 
.18 
-. 02 
.25 
.38 
-. 04 
-. 67 
-. 01 
-.02 
.13 
-. 01 
.04 
-. 25 
.27 
.16 
.27 
.28 
-. 00 
-. 10 
.03 
.06 
.01 
.10 
.01 
-. 05 
.12 
.12 
-. 05 
.18 
Percentage mentioning marital 
strains among disadvantages 3 0 0 4 0 0 
HPN-high-parity nonlimiters. 
LPL-Iow-parity limiters. 
In the three moderate-L:rtility countries, limiters gave these values rat­
ings at least . 10 higher than nonlimiters in 32 out of 36 comparisons.
Among the high-fertility countries, the record in Thailand and Turkey 
was almost as good, but in the Philippines support for the prediction 
was weal : and in Indonesia there was no support, but no contradic­
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high-parity nonlimiters and low-parity limiters, by country and sex: 
Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United States 
HPN LPL HPN LPL LPL LPLHPN HPN HPN LPL 
3 19 15 21 24 34 41 5129 505 13 33 53 0 0 71 85 0 01 0 3 1 80 83 9 23 61 530 4 17 23 0 18 5 23 28 28 
-. 12 .03 .30 .33 
.36 
.59.19 .38 .15 .04
-. 08 .01 -. 06 .19 -. 18 -. 30 .15 .30 .43 .31f)5 .22 
.31-. 10 -. 03 .17 .01 .30 .87 .92
-.12 .03 .15 .21 .06 .21 -. 03 .35 .65 .66
-. 02 .17 .29 .41 .17 .42 
.55.40 .48 .33
-.05 .14 -. 03 .12 -. 19 .17 .11 .44 -. 24 -.07 
0 0 0 6 20 0 1 6 7 
5 8 42 6 35 20 29 34 63 327 18 43 56 0 59 00 85 02 3 40 75 70 23 3719 511 11 10 22 12
10 23 37 50 38
 
-. 11 -. 03 .19 .38 .23 .44 .41 .54 .18 -. 09
.12 -.01 .04 .20 
-. 32 
.26-. 37 .13 .43 .19
-. 01 .10 .20 .45 -. 02 .18 -. 04 .24 .93 .92
.00 -. 03 .10 .23 .03 .36 .13 .36 .68 .69
-. 03 .22 .15 .32 
.55 
.64.23 .35 .68 .46
.02 .15 .00 .30 .08 .27 
.60 .13.35 .18 
0 1 0 9 0 0 0 3 0 7 
tory trends either. However, the low-fertility country, the UnitedStates, did supply contradictory trends: three values, not to be lonely,to be needed, and to complete the family, were more highly rated by
nonlimiters among both wives and husbands.Overall, Prediction S2 was reasonably well supported, as Figure 5 in­
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FIGURE 5 	Salience of marital bond and companionship, love 
by fertility level, after smoothing 
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dicates with a smoothed plot for two of the values. The differences in 
salience on 	the open-ended question were clearest and most consistent 
for the marital bond, and stronger toward the low-fertility end. Coin­parisons among the other three values from the open-ended question 
were complicated by overlapping categories, but generally they also be­
came more 	slient with low fertility. On the structured mCasures,
where values were distinguished differently, agenerally supportive pat­
tern was also found, with several values rising very sharply at low fer­
tility levels. It is notable that respondents who wanted "ewer children 
actually mentioned interaction rewards more often and those who
wanted more children mentioned these values less often, which should 
discourage any simple-minded attempt to add up different values at­
tached to children. Why the contrasts were weaker across Philippine
and Korean sample areas is not clear. Within both coun tries the col­
trasts between high-parity nonlimiters and low-parity limiters were 
usually as predicted, but the contrasts between communities and re­gions were largely blurred. Unlike economic values, which are limited 
by the opportunities available in each community, interaction rewards 
may have greater latitude for variation within communities, which may
partly explain the findings. 
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Marital strain. From the emergence of the conjugal family factor, the 
next prediction. S7, follows, that marital strain due to children should 
be more prominent at lower fertility levels. Since marital strain was 
quite low in salience on the dlisadvantages question. not being meni­
tioned at all in two coun try samples, it is unlikely that concern about 
this problem exerts a major influence on f'ertility. Marital strain was 
somewhat more salient in the United States, at the low-fertility end,
but not in West Germany, and also more salient in Korea. Across Philip­
pine regions. marital strain received little menition, and hardly varied in 
frequency. Across Korean regions, salience was higher, but linear trends 
were again absent. Between nonlimiters and limiters, the single difTer­
ence that approached 10 percentage points was among Korean hus­
bands, limiters more often mentioning marital strain. Prediction S7 
had at best minimal Sulpport in comparisons across countries, but may
not have been adequately tested because of'its low salience on the
 
question used.
 
Weakening cultural props for high fertility 
Social heneits. The next prediction, CI, involving weakening cultural 
props, covers three values of children: the family name or family line,
religio us and social obligations, aid adult status and social norms. 'he 
last two of these were substantially less salient among advantages of 
children than the economic hene fit values, which are in the same in­
struiental assistance cluster (Table 20). Few respondents considered 
social pressures to be a salient motive for childbearing. 12 Nor were any
of the three values more salient for high-fertility countries. The family 
name or famnily line varied considerably in salience, being higher among
husbands than wives ald in Taiwan and Indonesia than elsewhere. But 
no trend appeared across fertility levels. Religious and social obligations 
were higher in Turkey, but no higher in the other high-fertility coun­
tries than elsewhere. Adult status aid social norms appeared, in fact, to
rise in salience with lower fertility, being relatively high for low-fertility
countries (though this value was also relatively salient for Turkey). In 
the United States and West Germany, responses that "it's natural" to 
have children, that "that's what marriage is all about," and that Iiaving
children "makes you an aduilt" or "makes you feel more adult" were 
12 Ai I have observed elsewhere (Bulatao, 1975: 21), "This does not necessarilyindicate that group pressure was unimportant: it may be that group demands 
were so internalized as to become identical with individual interests. Although
the rhetoric of justification for childbearing may conceal collectivistic motiva­
tions, it isnevertheless predominantly individualistic." 
TABLE 20 Indicators of cultural props for high fertility, by country and sex: 1975-76 
Indicator Philip-
pines Turkey 
Indo-
nesia 
Thai-
land Korea Taiwan 
Singa-
pore 
United 
States 
West 
Germany 
WIVES 
Percentage mentiuning advantagesFamily name, line 
Religious, social obligations 
Adult status, social norms 
Ratings of reasons for having childrenTo continue family line 
To please relatives 
Religion 
Odd to be childless 
To be a woman/man 
Percentage mentioning overpopulation
among disadvantages 
Percentage considering overpopulation 
a somewhat serious or very seriousproblem 
Percentagea considering overpopulation 
a reason for themselves to have fewerchildren 
7 
1 
1 
.02 
-. 16 
-. 42 
-. 03 
-. 07 
0 
74 
63 
8 
7 
14 
.11 
-. 23 
-. 03 
.11 
.19 
1 
37 
54 
36 
3 
0 
.13 
-. 02 
-. 13 
-. 17 
-. 01 
0 
40 
23 
4 
2 
0 
.21 
-. 11 
-. 54 
-. 11 
-. 08 
0 
81 
54 
19 
2 
5 
.46 
.31 
-1.18 
.09 
-. 32 
1 
86 
71 
37 
1 
5 
.28 
.04 
-. 59 
.07 
.20 
0 
87 
66 
21 
0 
3 
.22 
.03 
-. 81 
.06 
.20 
0 
88 
48 
6 
2 
14 
-. 28 
-. 59 
-. 57 
-. 34 
.04 
3 
62 
43 
5 
0 
18 
-. 46 
-45 
-. 57 
-. 04 
.04 
1 
na 
30 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning advantagesFamily name, line 12 15 53 13 25 49 26 11 na 
Religious, social obligations 
Adult status, social norms 
1 
1 
22 
17 
7 
1 
4 
1 
5 
7 
3 
7 
Ratings of reasons for having children 
To continue family line 
To p'ease relatives 
Religion 
Odd to be childless 
To be a woman/man 
.11 
-. 21 
-. 51 
.00 
-. 06 
.27 
-. 18 
.05 
.03 
.04 
.13 
-. 01 
-. 07 
-. 22 
-. 08 
.32 
-. 10 
-. 68 
-. 12 
-. 05 
.39 
.21 
-1.12 
.06 
-. 30 
.31 
.03 
-. 67 
.09 
.17 
Percentage mentioning overpopulation 
among disadvantages 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Percentage considering overpopulation 
a somewhat serious or very seriousproblem 71 48 55 76 89 88 
Percentagea considering overpopulation 
a reason for themselves to have fewer
children 60 35 32 53 72 68 
na-not applicable to West German sample. 
a Base for percentages includes those who considered overpopulation not to be a serious problem at all. 
1 
5 
.32 
.03 
-. 80 
.03 
.15 
0 
88 
55 
4 
12 
na 
na 
-. 12 
-. 57 
-. 60 
-. 44 
-. 35 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
5 na 
60 na 
43 na 
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more common. In Turkey, the emphasis was oil the related idea that
"most people expect married couples to have children." 
Ratings of the importance of a similar set of five values also showed
the absence of any consistent downward trend. There were in fact no
monotonic trends in these ratings. For four of the values --particularlyfor continuing the family line and pleasing relatives, but also for be­
coming a woman or man (through having cliidrenl ) and the oddness ofbeing childless the ratings rose from high- to moderate-fertility Coun­tries, then fell sharply, to the lowest levels, for low-fertility coun tries.For pleasing relatives, for instance, the ratings were between 
-. 23 and 
-. 0 1 in the high-fertility countries, between .03 and .3 1 in the mod­
erate-fertility coun tries, and between 
-. 59 and -. 45 "Inthe low-fertility
countries. For the fifth value, religion, ratings fell from high- to mod­
erate-fertility coun tries, then rose slightly in low-fertility countries.

Two other values that miglht properly fall in this group-- to be 
remem­bered and to become a better person declined in ratings, as was earlier 
shown. 
Further Jisconfirmation of the prediction was provided in regional
comparisons. For the Philippines, the family name fluctuated in sa­lience ol the open-ended (luestion without definite pattern (Table 2 1).The other two values were too seldom mentioned for any clear pat­
terns to appear. Adult status and social norms, however, were slightly
more salient in Manila 
-contrary to predictions 
--than elsewhere. ForKorea, the levels of salience of these three values were generally higher
than in the Philippines, a finding that again was contrary to predictions(Table 22). A slight and inconsistent tendency for the family name todecline in salience at lower fertility levels was the only supportive find­ing. No trend appeared across Korean cities and counties ol the other 
two values. Among the structured ratings, becoming a wonlan or a manl 
was up slightly in ratings in the two lowest-fertility regions in the
Philippines. Other values showed no convincing trends. Inl Korea, be­
coming a woman or a man moved slightly downward. Again there were 
11o other solid trends. 
Between high-parity nonlim iters and low-parity limiters, the fewdifferences in the salience of these values among advantages of children 
were inconsistent with predictions (Table 23). Inl no case among wives 
was there a difference inl regard to the family name. Among husbands, 
a large percentage difference in regard to the family name did appearin five cases, but in four of' these the differences ran counter to predic­
tions. On the adult status and social norms value, the only differences 
were in the United States amid Turkey (among both wives and husbands) 
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and in Taiwan (among husbands). In each of these cases, low-parity
limiters considered this value more salient. There were 
large differencesbetween the two grou)s in roughly half the comparisons of value rat­ings, but the ditlTrences were as likely to go one way as th,.- other. Norwas it possible to identify individual values or individual countries that 
were more consistent than the others.In no set of comlparisons, therefore, did variations in perceived valuesattached to children agree with the cultural props explanation for thefertility transition. As Figure 6 illustrates, the family name did not de­crease in salience and one of the values, adult status and social norms,in fact appeared to in crease slightly in salience on the ope n-ended qies­tion with lower fertility. A rise in the salience and importance of someof these values at intermediate fertility levels and a subsequent declineare a possibility. However, cultural rather than, developmental factorsmay have produced the observed patterns. These patterns, furthermore,do not support the prediction. It may be that parents conceal tile cul­tural pressures for childbearing, either deliberately in order to avoidtile appearance of being manipuhiated by others or un inten ionally be­cause these pressures are thoroughly internalized. To rescue the cul­tural explanation, one would have to further hypothesize differentialrates of concealment of these values, and it is not easy to see whatcould account for these across fertility levels. It is possible also that thecultural explanation is more appropriate at a still earlier stage in the 
FIGURE 6 Silie ce of' faniily name and adult status, social 
norms by fertility level, after smoothing 
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TABLE 21 Indicators of cultural props for high fertility, by region and sex: Philippines, 1975 
Indicator Bicol Min-danao East Visayas Central Luzon West CentralCagayan Visayas Visayas Ilocos 
South­ern 
Iagalog City of Manila 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning 
advantagesFamily name, line 
Religious, social obligations 
Adult status, social norms 
Ratings of reasons for having
childrenTo continue family line 
To please relatives 
Religion 
Odd to be childless 
To be a woman/man 
Percentage mentioning over­
population among disad­vantages 
Percentage considering over­
population a somewhat serious 
or very serious problem 
Percentage considering over­
population a reason for them­selves to have fewer children 
9 
3 
1 
.06 
-. 08 
-. 40 
-. 21 
.03 
0 
76 
67 
15 
2 
2 
-. 12 
-. 49 
-. 54 
.11 
-. 30 
2 
58 
50 
3 
0 
0 
.06 
-. 14 
-. 36 
.18 
-. 21 
1 
61 
51 
4 
1 
1 
.03 
-. 09 
-. 41 
-. 17 
-. 03 
0 
59 
48 
9 
1 
0 
-. 17 
-. 41 
-. 43 
-. 05 
-. 22 
0 
59 
41 
5 
1 
0 
-. 01 
-. 05 
-. 48 
.03 
-. 12 
0 
87 
78 
12 
2 
1 
-. 05 
-. 43 
-. 33 
.12 
-. 27 
0 
71 
66 
14 
0 
0 
-. 06 
-. 33 
-. 51 
-. 36 
-. 27 
3 
71 
53 
4 
1 
1 
.12 
-. 05 
-. 38 
-. 03 
.09 
0 
82 
66 
16 
0 
4 
.08 
-. 15 
-. 60 
.08 
.14 
0 
84 
76 
HUSBANDS
 
Percentage mentioning 
advantages 
Family name, line 
Religious, social obligations 
Adult status, social norms 
Ratings of reasons for having 
children 
To continue fmaily line 
To please relatives 
Religion 
Odd to be childless 

To be a woman/man 

Percentage mentioning over­
population among disad­
vantages 

Percentage considering over­
populatio' a somewhat serious 
or very se.,ous problem 
Percentage considering over­
population a reason for them­
selves to have fewer children 
23 
0 
3 
.08 
-. 10 
-. 54 
-. 21 
.02 
0 
64 
59 
14 
3 
0 
.03 
-. 28 
-. 56 
.20 
-. 28 
0 
52 
47 
0 
0 
0 
.06 
-. 25 
-. 48 
.06 
-. 25 
0 
62 
51 
8 
0 
0 
.16 
-. 21 
-. 66 
-. 21 
-. 16 
0 
65 
58 
18 
0 
0 
.07 
-. 50 
-. 55 
.22 
-. 36 
5 
64 
44 
12 
0 
4 
.10 
-. 16 
-. 50 
.05 
.02 
0 
71 
63 
14 
0 
0 
.20 
-. 55 
-. 44 
.11 
-. 39 
0 
61 
57 
17 
0 
0 
.08 
-. 36 
-. 82 
.00 
-. 08 
0 
58 
41 
9 17 
3 0 
0) 8 
.14 .08 
-. 09 -. 08 
-. 41 -. 75 
-. 03 .00 
.11 .08 
0 0 
83 100 
66 83 
TABLE 22 Indicators of cultural props for high fertility, by sample area and sex: Korea, 1976 
Indicator Hong-chon Sosan Naju Jonju Jinju Chang-nyong Seong­nam Pusan Daegu Seoul 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning advantagesFamily name, line 
Religious, social obligations 
Adult status, social norms 
Ratings of reasons for having
childrenTo continue family line 
To please relatives 
Religion 
Odd to be childless 
T) be a woman/man 
Percentage mentioning over­population among disadvantages 
Percentage considering over­
population a somewhat serious orvery sericus problem 
Percentage considering over­
population a reason for them­selves to have fewer children 
19 
2 
8 
.55 
.41 
-1.08 
.06 
-. 42 
0 
80 
63 
19 
2 
4 
.43 
.32 
-1.12 
.16 
-. 35 
0 
86 
73 
37 
4 
4 
.43 
.28 
-1.41 
.07 
-. 33 
3 
90 
68 
-' 
31 
2 
11 
.50 
.')7 
-. 51 
2 
78 
62 
20 
6 
6 
.51 
.27 
-1.20 
.02 
-.28 
2 
89 
69 
20 
2 
4 
.53 
.31 
-1.19 
.03 
-. 35 
1 
71 
61 
27 
5 
6 
.42 
.37 
-1.22 
01 
-. 25 
1 
S0 
78 
3 
2 
10 
.37 
.30 
-1.03 
.09 
-. 26 
0 
92 
73 
11 
1 
4 
.45 
.29 
-1.26 
.10 
-. 31 
1 
88 
66 
11 
2 
3 
.42 
.31 
-1.16 
.15 
-. 25 
0 
93 
79 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning advantagesFamily name, line 
Religious, social obligations 
Adult status, social norms 
Ratings of reasons for having
 
children
To continue family line 
To please relatives 

Religion 

Odd to be childless 

To be a woman/man 

Percentage mentioning over­population among disadvantages 
Percentage considering over­
population a somewhat seriousor very sericus problem 
Percentage considering over­
population a reason for themselveshaving fewer children 
26 
0 
7 
.36 
.25 
-1.16 
.25 
-. 33 
0 
97 
80 
32 
5 
9 
.36 
.09 
-1.04 
.13 
-. 38 
5 
92 
71 
50 
15 
6 
.49 
.34 
-1.35 
.08 
-. 26 
6 
77 
61 
37 
7 
15 
.57 
.12 
-1.09 
-. 01 
-. 52 
5 
87 
60 
21 
7 
0 
.40 
.25 
-1.06 
.01 
-. 27 
0 
83 
76 
16 
5 
11 
.14 

.22 
-1.25 
-. 03 
-. 50 
5 
73 
61 
17 
2 
10 
.31 
.25 
-1.21 
.19 
-. 17 
2 
94 
82 
5 
9 
9 
.39 
.23 
-1.04 
.06 
-. 17 
0 
100 
82 
33 
5 
5 
.35 
.23 
-1.27 
-. 06 
-. 19 
3 
85 
60 
17 
3 
4 
.39 
.25 
-1.03 
.03 
-. 22 
2 
94 
82 
W, 
00 
84 
TABLE 23 Indicators of cultural props for high fertility among high-
Philippines Turkey Indonesia 
Indicator Fl PN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL 
WIVES 
Percentage mentioning 
advantages
Family name, line 
Religious, social obligations
Adult status, social norms 
9 
1 
1 
10 
0 
0 
6 
10 
6 
13 
9 
21 
35 
3 
0 
38 
0 
0 
Ratings of reasons for having
children 
To continue family line 
To please relatives 
Religion
Odd to be childless 
To be a woman/man 
.02 
-. 14 
-. 37 
.00 
-. 10 
-. 00 
-.08 
-.31 
.04 
-. 05 
.38 
-. 17 
.23 
.10 
.16 
.13 
-. 40 
-. 38 
-. 02 
.24 
.13 
--.03 
-. 15 
-. 12 
-. 02 
.18 
.07 
-. 23 
-. 23 
-. 05 
Percentage mentioning over­
population among disad­
vantages 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Percentage considering over­
population a somewhat serious 
or very serious problem 71 84 21 67 36 46 
Percentage considering over­
population a reason for them­
selves to have fewer children 58 77 9 52 17 25 
HUSBANDS 
Percentage mentioning 
advantagesFamily name, line 
Religious, social obligations
Adult status, social norms 
Ratings of reasons for having
children 
0 
0 
0 
14 
7 
0 
4 
55 
6 
25 
23 
24 
53 
1 
0 
33 
6 
0 
To continue family line 
To please relatives 
Religion 
Odd to be childless 
To be a woman/man 
Percentage mentioning over­
population among disad­
vantages 
.10 
-. 07 
-. 49 
-. 10 
.00 
0 
.05 
-. 15 
-. 48 
.05 
-. 02 
0 
.13 
-. 09 
.18 
.08 
.28 
0 
.37 
-. 50 
-. 11 
-. 13 
-. 05 
0 
.10 
-. 03 
-. 04 
-. 20 
-. 11 
0 
.12 
-. 16 
-. 16 
-. 32 
.01 
0 
Percentage considering over­
population a somewhat serious 
or very serious problem 63 73 9 73 49 69 
Percentage considering over­
population a reason for them­
selves to have fewer children 55 56 9 64 22 48 
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parity nonlimiters and low-parity limiters, by country and sex: 1975-76 
Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United States 
11PN LPL HPN LPL HPN LPL IlPN LPL HPN LPL 
2 
2 
0 
8 
3 
0 
16 
7 
5 
7 
0 
5 
39 
2 
2 
30 
1 
9 
25 
0 
2 
17 
1 
1 
11 
6 
6 
5 
2 
1i 
.09 
-. 09 
-. 17 
-. 06 
-. 07 
.22 
-. 17 
-. 72 
-. 21 
-. 12 
.53 
.24 
-1.24 
.15 
-. 37 
.29 
.30 
-1.11 
.18 
-. 29 
.27 
.02 
-. 48 
.09 
.14 
.24 
-. 03 
-. 69 
.12 
.27 
.24 
-. 13 
-. 75 
.13 
.28 
.09 
.07 
-. 88 
.14 
.16 
-.49 
-. 80 
-. 52 
.04 
.09 
-. 28 
-. 58 
-. 58 
-. 28 
.01 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
87- 83 71 91 81 93 86 92 36 75 
49 52 58 72 49 77 24 53 12 55 
3 
7 
0 
17 
4 
1 
10 
0 
0 
20 
5 
9 
45 
0 
0 
42 
4 
12 
23 
6 
0 
18 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
9 
4 
14 
.23 
-. 11 
-. 49 
-. 03 
-. 06 
.32 
-. 24 
-. 76 
-. 16 
-. 07 
.37 
.25 
-1.33 
.15 
-. 38 
.16 
.06 
-1.01 
.06 
-. 42 
.28 
.13 
-. 62 
-.02 
.23 
.20 
-. 06 
-. 81 
.12 
.15 
.19 
-. 26 
-. 59 
.24 
-. 15 
.13 
-. 01 
-. 75 
-. 01 
.06 
-.44 
-. 94 
-. 44 
-. 44 
-. 32 
-. 18 
-. 58 
-. 52 
-. 51 
-. 38 
0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 4 
71 75 90 99 53 92 88 91 57 61 
40 59 85 91 29 71 44 53 46 42 
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transition--i.e., for tribal rather than peasant societies. This hypothesiscannot he tested with the current samples. 
Overpopulation. Prediction C7, that concern with overpopulation re­lates to lower fertility, also follows from the weakening cultural propsfactor, though I argued earlier that this prediction was not essential tothe factor. Overpopulation was very low in salience on the open-endedquestion. In the U.S. sample, 3 percent of' wives and 5 percent of' hus­bands mentioned overpopulation, and the percentages dropped offfrom there. None of' the comparisons across coLIn tries, across Philip­pine and Korean sample areas, between nonlimiters and limiters pro­vided sufficient contrasts to support this prediction (Tables 20 to 23).On structured questions, more variation could be observed. ('oncernwith overpopulation, like financial costs, see med to peak in moderate­fertility countries, then decline in low-fertility coun tries. Vithin coun­tries no firm trend could be established: in tile PIhili ppines concernwith this problem did not consistently increase at lower fertility levels,and in Korea there was only a slight increase in the nuniher vlho saidthey took overpl)opulation into account in clildbearing. Between non­limiters and limiters, however, the contrasts were clear and consistent.Limiters more often considered overpolllation a serious problem andmore often judged it a reason for having fewer children themselves.Why these contrasts appeared whereas other contrasts did not is not
 
clear.
 
The variations in the values and disvalues related to the culturalprops explanation may mirror cultural norms and practices rather thansocioeconomic development or fertility levels. ('oncern with the fam­ily line, for instance, appeared to be high in the more patriarchal so­cieties regardless of development level. ('oncem about overpopulation
appeared to reflect official birth control programs and family planning
propaganda rather than development level. The data do not deny that
the weakening of cultural props for high fertility may be a factor in
the fertility transition in a lzarticular country where these props are
initially strong. However, weakening cultural props do not seem. fromthe evidence of' these value measures, to be an essential part of' the fer­tility transition as a universal process. 
Mortality reduction 
Only tangential evidence regarding Prediction D I, that mortality re­duction should make the achievement of security through many chil­dren a less prominent value, appeared among the open-ended responses. 
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One disvalue, worry over childrcn's sickness, may be relevant to mor­tality reduction. This disvalue did appear to decline in salience across
countries, as earlier observed (see Table 12). This disvalue aside, mor­
tality reduction was alone among the predictions in not being reflected 
among advantages or disadvantages of children. This finding may havebeen largely due to the way the questions were phrased, contrastin,,
children and no children rather than difterent Inumbers of childrenlSome evidence regarding Prediction DI is available from a separate
question. Each respondent was asked what she or he thougdht of havingan Only chlId and wh at was the basis for that evaluation. The responses
were open-ended, and occasionally vague, such as not wanting an only
child because it is "'notgood for the parents." Those who specifically
mentioned that an only child inigh t die, that it, he died there would be 
no one t: replace him, or that they would be more secure with more
children are shown in Table 24. The frequency 01' such explicit refer­
ences to mortality risks varied considerably across countries, being
highest (between 
 27 and 4 1 percent) in Turkey and Thailand, lower inthe other high-fertility countries, and (except f'or Taiwan) zero in the
moderate and low-fertility countries. Across regions in the Philippincs(Table 25) concern with mortality rose slightly rather than falling. No
comparisons were possible within the Korean sample because no one
explicitly mentioned mortality risks. Across individuals the differences 
were not consistent (Table 24). In Thailand it was the limiters among
both wives and husbands who mentioned mortality risks more often,

as was also true with huLsbanls in Turkey, but among husbands in Tai­
wan it was the nonlimiters who mentioned such risks more often. Thereis thus sonie indication that, at moderate and low fertility levels across
countries, children beyond the first were less tiseful for providing in­
surance against mortality, but Within countries the same prediction was 
not genIL:alIy supported. 
Correlations 
A statistical summary of'the l'indings is provided in Tables 26 and 27inthe form of'correlations, across countries and across sample areasfor the Philippines and Korea, between fertility rates and the frequency
with which each value and Lisvalue was mentioned on the advantages
or disadvan tages question. The taoles also give mean percentage differ­
ences across countries between high-parity nonlimiters and low-paritylimiters int'requency of mentioning each value and disvalue. Because
the structuretd measures are more varied, these tables do not includethem. The tables have to be treated with cauiion. Particularly for sel­
00 TABLE 24 	 Percentage who considered an only child undesirable because of mortality risks, among all
respondents and among high-parity nonlimiters and low-parity limiters, by country and sex:1975-76 
Sex and type
of respondents Philippines Turkey Indonesia Thailand Korea Taiwan Singapore United States 
WIVES 
All wives 	 17 41 12 33 0 8 0 0High-parity nonlimiters 23 41 13 29 0 5 0 0Low-parity limiters 15 35 15 42 0 3 0 0 
HUSBANDS 
All husbands 16 27 12 31 0 12 0 0High-parity nonlimiters 10 7 12 21 0 15 0 0Low-pdrity limiters 14 23 6 35 0 2 0 0 
NOTE: Base for percentages includes those who considered an only child desirable. 
TABLE 25 Percentage who considered an only child undesirable because of mortality risks, by sex and
region: Philippines, 1975 
Sex Bicol Min-danao East Visayas Central Luzon West CentralCagayan Visayas Visayas Ilocos 
South­
ern City ofTagalog Manila 
All wives 14 15 12 19 24 17 16 25 15 25 
All husbands 13 11 15 8 9 25 22 9 17 17 
00 
TABLE 26 Association between fertility level and perceived advantages of children: summary measures,by sex, 1975-76 M 
Correlation Correlation Correlation Mean percentage Correlationacross countries across regions across sample difference across across countrieswith 1976 crude with 1968 TFR, areas with 1974 countries, with 1976 perbirth rate Philippines TFR, Korea HPN-LPL capita GNPaAdvantage Wivesb Hus- Hus- Hus- Hus- Hus­
bands Wives bands Wives bands Wives bands Wives bandsInstrumental assistanceHelp in housework 
.73 .70 .68 .47 .64 .58 8.3 4.9Help in old age .75 .70 -. 59 .06 .74 -. 51 -. 39
 Financial, practical help .87 .84 .56 .39 -. 03 
.75 11.6 11.7 -. 75 -. 70

.29 8.0 6.1 -. 78Family name, line 
.07 -. 04 -. 68-. 42 -. 08 .54 .40 1.9 -5.0 -. 42 -. 35Religious, social obligations 
.56 .40 .58 .08 .20 -. 04 1.9 2.0 -. 31 -. 15Adult status, social norms -. 60 -. 29 -. 61 -. 14 .16 .19 -3.9 -6.9 .76 .43
Rewarding interactions
Companionship, love 
-. 81 -. 90 .47 .37 .35 .51 -7.0 6.3Happiness 
-. 19 .73 .88-. 06 .00 .58 -. 34 -. 24 -6.7 -7.0Play, fun, distraction 
-. 23 -. 53 -. 24 -. 60 -.35 .03 -. 17 -. 17 -3.4 -6.7Marital bond .15 .42
-. 82 -. 84 -. 45 -. 66 -. 56 -. 30 -7.9 -9.3 .92 .84Psychological appreciationLiving through children 
-. 37 -. 37 -. 03 .08 .07 -. 56Achievement, power -1 -. 7 .61 .54
-. 45 -. 49 .20 .36 .37 .10 1.1 -2.0 .57Character, responsibility .60
-. 69 -. 36 .22 -. 69 -. 50 -. 30 -. 7 -1.3 .80Incentive to succeed 
.24 .00 .66 -. 12 -. 14 .30 .12 -1.7 1.1 -. 42Fulfillment .19
-. 82 -. 68 -. 54 .03 -. 13 -. 45 -2.9 -4.5 .97 .90Insurance against mortalityc 
.71 .72 -. 60 -. 27 d d .1 -1.9 -. 44 -. 52 
NOTE: The .05 level of significance (one-tailed) is reached for all these correlations somewhere between .51 and .56 or-.51 and -. 56.a Source of GNP data: Population Reference Bureau (1976).b West Germany was included in calculations for this column, except for the last row, but excluded everywhere else. 
c From the separate question on an only child.
d Cannot be computed because this value was not mentioned by respondents. 
TABLE 27 Association between fertility level and perceived disadvantages of children: summary
measures, by sex, 1975-76 
Correlation Correlation Correlationacross countries Mean percentage Correlationacross regions across sample difference acrosswith 1976 crude across countrieswith 1968 TFR, areas with 1974 countries, with 1976 perbirth rate Philippines TFR, Korea HPN-LPL capita GNPHus- Hus- Hus- Hus- Hus-Disadvantage Wivesa bands Wives bands Wives bands Wives bands Wives bands 
Financial costsCost of education 
.79 .80 .09 -. 44 .73 .53Other financial costs 
.16 
-. 16 .17 .09 2.0 2.9 -. 56 -. 39.54 .80 4.9 18.9 -. 09 .17
 
Childrearing demands
More work 
.03 -. 05 .34 .63 -. 38Emotional strain b -1.3 .5 -. 19
-. 46 -. 59 .49 .58 .15 -.18Health, pregnancy 
.61 .42 -. 18 -1.0 -1.1 .10 .14.40 .29Discipline 
.51 -. 75 -. 44 0.0 -1.1 -. 29 .10.37 -. 10 -. 44 .57 .63 -2.5 
-2.4Child's sickness 
.55 .49 .39 .01 .12 -. 52 -. 36
 Worry over child's future 
.18 -. 01 .18 -3.1 -7.6 -. 44 -. 33
-. 34 .53 .29Other childrearing problems 
.23 .44 -1.5 -10 -. 11 .18.51 -. 11 .67 .14 .23 1.1 2.5 -. 11 -. 37Restrictions on parentsTied down 
-. 88 -. 76 .22 -. 68 -. 17Can't work -. 08 -13.6 -8.0 .96 .97
-. 71 .34 .37 .19 .09 .09 -3.3 
-2.3 
.80 -. 15Costs to social relationshipsMarital strains 
-. 50 -. 44 -25 .25 
-. 36Overpopulation .10 -1.1 -2.6 .64 .58
-. 49 -. 60 .09 .12 .15 .17 
-. 4 -1.4 
.76 .78 
NOTE: The .05 level of significance (one-tailed) is reached for all these correlations somewhere between .51 and .56 or -. 51 and -. 56.a West Germany was included in calculations for this column, but excluded everywhere else.b Cannot be computed because this value was not mentioned by respondents. 
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dom mentioned values, large correlations can be produced by a sii'gle 
or a couple of high percentages. For values that vary only slightly in 
salience, a small change can produce a sizable correlation. Moreover, 
as observed earlier, some values did not increase or decrease in salience 
linearly, showing greater change at one or tie other end of the fer­
tility continuum. These caveats aside, the tables do provide some ob­jective measure of the trends that have beel discussed. 
Table 26 confirms the greater salience of economic benefits from 
children at higher fertility levels (or lower salience at lower fertility
levels) and the inconsistent trends in social benefit values. It also con­
firms the increase in salience of enhanced marital bond through chil­
dren and, to some extent, of companionship with children at lower 
fertility levels, plus slight similar trends in some psychological ap­
preciation values. Table 27, on the disadvantages of children, confirms 
that perceived child costs did not increase, and, in some cases, actually
decreased with lower fertility: that childrearillg demands changed with 
lower fertility, though not necessarily Upward or .Iownward in the ag­
gregate: and that restrictions on parents increased widh lower fertility.
In the correlations across countries. it makes little difference whether 
1975, 1976, or 1977 crude birth rates are used, since these are all 
highly correlated. A more refined rate, the 19"73 gross reproduction 
rate, also gives similar results. 
The last two columns of each table present correlations across coun­
tries with 1976 per capita GNP. Since per capita GNP and fertility are 
':ighly related in this sample, the last two columns resemble th first 
two in each table except for sign. Where the correlations vary slightly,
what is mainly reflected is the somewhat anomalous position of Tur­
key. The values and disvalues for the Turkey sample seemed to imply
lower fertility than actual rates. The pattern of responses was generally
closer to the moderate-fertility than to the high-fertility countries,
with which Turkey fornally belongs. As noted earlier, this sample also 
had more limiters and fewer nonlimiters than expected. Turkey's per
capita GNP in 1976 was more than double that of any of the other 
high-fertility countries, above Korea's and close to Taiwan's, which 
suggests a possible explanation for this pattern. 13 
13 A recent study of fertility decline in 94 developing countries (Mauldin and
Berelson, 1978) confirms that Turkey is a special case. It was one of only two
countries with substantially greater decline than expected from measures of 
modernization and family planning program effort. 
93 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Data from both open-ended and structured questions on values anddisvalues attached to children provided clear and uneq,v,,cal supportfor one of the five demand-related explanatory factors for the fertilitytransition, sharp discon firmation for another of' the factors, and am­biguous or conflicting results Ior t'e other three factors. [le economicfactor, vanishing ecollOnlic roles Ior children, was supported by the ex­pected variations in perceived economic benefits !rom children, andthese perceptions were clearly tied t0 f'ertility intentions. On tile otherhand, the cultural factor, weakening cultural props for high fertility,Was not Supported. Other studies on tile vaIue of children liave indi­cated that, in both traditional a1d Modern set tings. social pressures tohave children are seldum mentioned and are given little importance
(Arnold and others. 1975: l ulatao, 
 19 7 5L There is nothing here to
contradict that finding.Tile dem ographic factor, mortality redluctiol,, "ound support fromthe perceived disadvantages of' having an only child. Concern with in­surance against child mortality did not appear amone, the general ad­vantage: of children, however, nor did it relate to 1ertility intentions,thus leaving some doubt about the importance of' this factor.
The social factor, the emergence of' the conjugal family, 
was relatedin the prediction set to one cluster of values and three clusters of dis­values. The prediction rclaling to values was supported, but the pre­dictions relating to disvalues were 
not. Children's companionship andreinforcement of' the marital bond did become more salient at low fer­tility levels, and were related to small-f'amily intentions in low-fertilityareas. But the increases in marital strain, ill childrearing demands, andin perceived financial costs that were predicted to accompary the
value changes did not appear. File closest thing to the predicted in­creases in disvalues was a somewhat greater emphasis on the emotionalstrain of childrearing at moderate and low fertility levels. I had assunedearlier that the increase in some values attached to children as a resultof' tile spread of tile conjugal family would be more than offset by in­creasing disvalues. Since this was not the case, could there be someother way the emergence of' the conjugal family contributes to fertilitydecline, independently of' the other f'actors? One possibility would bethat values involving closeness to children and spouse lay be ade­quately attained only with small families. There may be other possi­bilities, but since this isonly speculation it might be lel't for I'rther 
research. 
The psychological factor, higher aspirations, similarly had its share 
94 
of successes and failures. As predicted, some of the psychological ap­
preciation values were higher in salience and importance at low fer­
tility levels. Contrary to predictions, however, the financial costs of 
children and childrearing demands did not rise as fertility fell. 
Financial costs were a factor in individual f,-rtility intentions, but 
may have been, counterbalanced by higher incomes and did not appear 
to be a factor in areal and country comparisons. Again as predicted, 
perceived restrictions on parents were higher at low fertility levels 
and related systematically to fertility intcntions. Two aspects of the 
aspirations factor were earlier distinguished: aspirations the parent 
has for herself or himself (the "time cost" aspect) and aspirations for 
the children. The positive evidence relates entirely to the former, the 
negative evidence to the latter. The aspirations factor therefore splits 
neatly in half, half supported and half contradicted by the data. 14 
Few of the trends,¢ in values and disvalues examined in relation to 
these factors were linear across fertility levels. There seemed to be not 
one but two value-of-children transitions, the first between high and 
moderate fertility levels and the second between moderate and low 
fertility levels. Table 28 attempts to summarize the values and dis­
values that were observed to distinguish each stage. 
The assumption is that the secular transformation of values is not 
a smooth process, and that particular changes are important at par­
ticular points in the fertility transition. This assum ption helps account 
for some apparent contradictions between country, regional, and indi­
vidual comparisons. For instance, restrictions on parents increased 
across countries but not across Philippine or Korean sample areas, and 
they also failed to distinguish limiters and nonlimiters, except in the 
14 	Although this study was not specifically designed to test Caldwell's (1977) re­
statement of demographic transition theory, it is worth noting the several 
positive as well as negative implications for his theory. Economic benefits did 
decline, as he would have predicted, but economic costs did not rise, contrary 
to his expectations. The decline in benefits was gradual, and related at each 
stage to lower fertility. There was no indication of Caldwell's "great divide," 
that point where the direction of the wealth flow changes and the transition 
supposedly takes place. The emotional nucleation of the family did appear in 
the data, but its link to the wealth flow was not established. Economic bene­
fits appeared to decline before the values related to family nucleation increased. 
Other social and psychological reasons for childbearing, which Caldwell de­
moted to second-level determinants, in fact appeared to be at least equally im­
portant, particularly the factor of personal aspirations. There are, therefore,
elements of perceptiveness in Caldwell's formulation, but the organization of 
the elements is not persuasive. 
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TABLE 28 Observed changes in values and disvalues attached to 
children 
Explanatory factor 
Vanishing economic 

roles for children 

Rising aspirations 
Emergence of the 
conjugal family 
Weakening cultural props
for high fertility 
Mortality reduction 
Transition from high to

moderate fertility levels 

Financial, practical help 

declines 

Help inhousework declines 
Cost of education declines
 (contrary to prediction)
 
Emotional strain rises 

Cost of education declines
 
(contrary to prediLtion)
 
Emotional strain rises 

Companionship, love rises 
(less sharply) 

Fun rises (less sharply) 

Marital bond rises (less 

sharply) 

Insurance against mortality
 
declines
 
Transition from moder­
ate to low fertility levels 
Financial, practical help 
declines 
Help in old age declines 
Being tied down rises 
Fulfillment rises 
Achievement, power 
rises 
Discipline declines 
Discipline declines 
Companionship, love 
rises (more sharply) 
Fun rises (more sharply) 
Marital bond rises 
(more sharply) 
Adult status, social 
norms rises (slightly, 
contrary to prediction) 
low-fertility country. The failure of these disvalues to relate to fertilitylevels within countries at earlier stages of the transition is understand­
able if these disvalues do not incr-ase in prominence until late in thetransition. Similarly, rewarding interactions values rose across coun­tries, but, in the low-fertility country, were linked with higher ratherthan lower individual fertility. If interest in interaction rewards reaches 
a plateau at a relatively high level late in the transition, as this interest 
ceases to increase it could become linl. d with having more rather thanhaving fewer children. The economic benefit values provide a more in­
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tricate illustration: specific values are differentiating only at specific
levels, in accordance with the pattern shown in Table 28. 
The pittern of changes indicates that the mortality reduction factor 
operates in the early transition, the vanishing economic roles factor inboth early and late transition, tiie conjugal family factor to a slight
extent inl the early and to a greater extent in the late transition, and 
the aspirations factor predominantly in tie late transition. It bears
emphasizing that two other factors in tile fertility transition 
-increased 
contraceptive availability and delayed marriage-should also be opera­
tive, but they are not represented in Table 28 because they are not 
demand factors and have no direct implications for values and disval-
LIes attached to children. 
The changes in positive values indicated are all monotonic though
not necessarily linear. Disvalues may be differcnt. Perceived fii' -cial 
costs and childrearing demands seem to rise for moderate-fertility
countries and then fall off slightly for low-fertility countries. Thisfinding suggests the possibility that, at intermediate levels, a perceived
costs-of-children squeeze takes place that wrings out some of the "ex­
tra" children. When, over the long run, conditions for couples improve,
the lost children are not made up, perhaps because other values and 
disvalues have come into play.
Regarding disvalues, too, there were two cases where individual com­
parisons produced differences but .ountry comparisons did not. 71e;
ceived financial costs was one case, where nonlimiter-limiter compari­
sons indicated some link 
to fertility but country comparisons did not (other than the hypothe tical intermediate squeeze just mentioned).
Concern with overpopulation was another case: limiters were more 
concerned than nonlimiters, but this concern was no stronger in low­
than in high-fertility countries. The disjunctions suggest that these so­
cial and economic concerns 
-and possibly others-may be relatively
"permanent" concomitants of lower fertility that exert similar, basi­
cally unchanging influence under each fertility regime.
It is entirely possible that, with the small number of countries 
covered, what I have interpreted as high-to-moderate and moderate­
to-low patterns in fact originate in cultural or other national differ­
ences unrelated to stage in the fertility transition. Differe:lt sequences 
may be possible for different countries witih distinctive histories and
cultures. Since the focus has been on comparisons, individual factors 
may have been missed that contribute to the transition in specific
countries or cultural groups, though not generally. The in terpretations
that have been made are limited by the countries that have been con­
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sidered. A different pattern for the value-of-children transition or tran­
sitions could conceivably have been obtained with a different set of 
countries. It would be worth investigating a different set, and, even 
more, collecting longitudinal data on several countries to avoid con­
founding cultural contrasts. If such data confirm the conclusions in
this paper, it would be worth investigating next how transitions in the
values and disvalues of children are produced, and what specific mech­
anisms link the changing values and disvalues to fertility intentions and 
behavior. It has not been the aim of this paper to answer these ques­
tions, but merely to attempt to implicate values and disvalues of chil­
dren in the fertility transition. 
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